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1 2  1 Introduction 
1  Introduction 
When unemployed  workers  receive  unemployment beneﬁts they  have  a disincentive to search for 
a job.  To  restore  search  incentives  often  activation  measures  are  introduced.  Unemployed  are 
required to  attend intensive interviews  with  employment  counselors,  to  apply  for job  vacancies 
as directed by  employment  counselors,  to independently  search for job  vacancies  and  to  apply for 
jobs,  to  accept  oﬀers  of suitable  work,  and  to  attend  training  programs.  If  unemployed  workers 
are unwilling  to participate in such  activities,  search insuﬃciently for a job  or reject job  oﬀers 
they  may  face  a  reduction  of  their  unemployment  beneﬁts,  i.e.  they  may  get  a  beneﬁt  sanction 
imposed.  Such  a  beneﬁt  sanction  may  be  permanent  or  temporary  and  may  involve  a  partial 
reduction  or  a  complete  removal  of  unemployment  beneﬁts. 
Interest  in  the  use  beneﬁt  sanctions  is  motivated  by  the  observation  that,  on  one  hand,  the 
frequently  used  policy  of  active  labor  market  programs  is  often  not  successful  in  getting  the 
unemployed  immediately  back  to  work.  On  the  other  hand,  the  potentially  successful  policy  of 
close  monitoring  and beneﬁt sanctions is not used  very  often.  The overview by Grubb (2000) 
shows  a  wide range  of  experiences in terms  of  sanction policies.  For instance,  sanctions  enforced 
on  unemployed job  seekers  are frequently  applied in Switzerland  and  the Czech Republic,  while 
in  Denmark  they  are  hardly  used.  Furthermore,  an  interesting  result  in  the  recent  evaluation 
literature is  that,  among the broad  range  of  active labor  market policies, programs  with intensive 
counseling  and job  search  assistance did  much better  than  other programs, in particular  when 
combined  with  close  monitoring  and  enforcement  of  the  work  test.  Typically  these programs do 
not  involve  risks  that  participants  are  locked  into  programs  with  reduced  search  activity  as  a 
1 consequence.
This paper presents one of  the  ﬁrst empirical  studies that looks beyond  unemployment exits 
and  provides  a  comprehensive  evaluation  of  the  eﬀects  of  beneﬁt  sanctions.  In  addition  to  the 
eﬀects  on  unemployment  durations,  we  evaluate  the  eﬀects  on  post-unemployment  employment 
stability,  exits  from  the  labor  market  and  earnings.  Assessing  the  overall  impact  of  a  system 
of  beneﬁt  sanctions  is  a  non-trivial  exercise.  Consider  for  example  the  case  in  which  beneﬁt 
sanctions  induce  to  accept  jobs  that  do  not  last  that  long.  Then  it  may  be  that  the  reduced 
employment  duration  and  reduced  unemployment  duration  cancel  out,  i.e.  equilibrium  unem­
ployment  is  not  aﬀected.2  Or,  even  worse,  the  average  duration  of  employment  goes  down  so 
much  that  equilibrium  unemployment goes  up  despite the fact that the  average duration  of  un­
employment  goes  down.  Also  at  the  level  of  the  individual  worker  a  reduction  in  employment 
duration could imply  that  overall  the worker is worse oﬀ in terms of  earnings, i.e.  the earlier em­
1 In  their  survey  on  the  success  of  active  labor  market  policy  programs  in  OECD  countries  Martin  and  Grubb 
(2001)  conclude  that governments  should  rely  as  much  as possible  on in-depth  counseling, job-ﬁnding incentives 
and job-search  assistance programs  as  other  more intense programs  are  not  very  eﬀective.  In Lalive  et  al.  (2008) 
and Gerﬁn  and Lechner (2002)  similar pessimistic  conclusions  are drawn  with  respect to the  eﬀectiveness  of Swiss 
active  labor  market  programs. 
2 It  is  easy  to  show  that  in  a  steady  state  labor  market  the  unemployment  rate  is  equal  to 
Tu  ,  where  Tu  is  Tu+Te 
the  average  duration  of  unemployment  and  Te  is  the  average  duration  of  employment. 3  1 Introduction 
ployment  re-entry  is  insuﬃcient  to  compensate  for  the  reduction  in  earnings  due  to  the  shorter 
employment duration.  Even if job  stability is  not  an issue, individual  workers  could  still face  a 
reduction in their life time income if  they  are forced  to  accept jobs  with lower  wages.  Again the 
reduction  in  unemployment  duration  could  be  insuﬃcient  in  income  terms  to  cover  the  lower 
income  while  employed.  In  other  words,  in  income  terms  beneﬁt  sanctions  only  represent  a  net 
gain to individual workers if  their post-unemployment job  stability  and  earnings do not go down 
too  much. 
We  use  rich,  administrative data  on Swiss job seekers  with four distinguishing features.  First, 
we  merge  detailed  and  comprehensive  histories  on  the  timing  of  beneﬁt  sanctions  with  medium­
run  information  on  the  post-unemployment  labor  market  success.  This  allows  us  to  assess  the 
eﬀects  of  beneﬁt  sanctions  on  post-unemployment  earnings.  Second,  exhaustive  information  on 
pre-unemployment earnings  and  employment  allow  us  to  control for  a key  source  of heterogeneity 
between job  seekers.  Third,  a  unique feature  of this data is that  the  available information  also 
allows  us  to  distinguish  between  the  eﬀect  of  a  warning  that  a  sanction  may  be  imposed  and 
the  actual  beneﬁt  reduction.  Fourth,  we  distinguish  between  exits  to  paid  employment  and 
(possibly temporary)  unregistered  unemployment.  This  is  important  because  beneﬁt  sanctions 
may  aﬀect  both  transitions  to  employment  and  transitions  to  non-employment.  Taken  together, 
this  database  allows  us  to  provide  comprehensive  information  on  how  beneﬁt  sanctions  aﬀect 
job seekers. 
Our  empirical  analysis  provides  estimates  of  the  key  parameters  that  are  essential  in  a  com­
prehensive  analysis  of  the  eﬀects  of  beneﬁt  sanctions.  Speciﬁcally,  we  contrast  the  eﬀects  of 
sanctions  on  the  time  spent  in  unemployment  with  the  eﬀects  of  beneﬁt  sanctions  on  employ­
ment durations  and  earnings for job  seekers  who  experience  a  sanction.  This  allows  us to  speak 
about  the  net  eﬀect  of  actually  experiencing  a  beneﬁt  sanction  on  post  unemployment  earnings 
–  i.e.  the  ex  post  eﬀect  of  beneﬁt  sanctions.  Moreover,  we  use  regional  variation  in  the  proba­
bility  of being  warned  of future beneﬁt  reductions to provide key  evidence  on the  ex  ante  eﬀects 
of  beneﬁt  sanctions  on  the  time  spent  unemployed  and  on  post  unemployment  earnings.  This 
allows  us to provide  evidence  on the  net  eﬀects  of beneﬁt  sanctions  on  all job  seekers  regardless 
of  whether  they  are  actually  sanctioned  or  not. 
The  small  body  of  recent  empirical  literature  on  beneﬁt  sanctions  is  mainly  of  European 
origin  and  supports the positive  short-term  eﬀects  on the  exit  rate from  unemployment.3  Lalive 
et  al.  (2005) use  similar  unemployment  data  as  we  do  ﬁnding  that  not  only  the  enforcement  of 
a  beneﬁt  sanction  has  a  positive  eﬀect  on  the  exit  rate  from  unemployment.  A  warning  that 
a  sanction  may  be  imposed  has  a  similar  eﬀect.  Lalive  et  al.  (2005)  is  also  the  ﬁrst  empirical 
investigation  on the magnitude of  the so called  ex-ante  eﬀect, the eﬀect that in the presence  of  a 
3 In the U.S. sanctions have been a central feature of the welfare  reforms  of the 1990s (Bloom and Winstead, 
2002).  Nevertheless,  little  is  known  about  the  eﬀects  of  such  sanctions.  Ashenfelter  et  al.  (2005)  for  example  do 
not  ﬁnd  a  signiﬁcant  impact  of  sanctions  on  unemployment  insurance  claims  and  beneﬁts,  which  may  be  related 
to  the  small  size  of  the  sanctions. 4  2 Institutional Procedures in the Swiss UI System 
sanction system the job  ﬁnding  rate goes up because unemployed  want to avoid being punished.4 
The  ex  ante  eﬀect  also  reduces  unemployment  duration.  Two  Dutch  papers  ﬁnd  that  beneﬁt 
sanctions double the  outﬂow from  unemployment to  a job (Abbring  et  al.  (2005)  and Van den 
Berg  et al.  (2004)).  Using Danish data Svarer (2007)  ﬁnds that the unemployment exit rate 
increases  by  more  than  50%  following  enforcement  of  a  sanction.  Jensen  et  al.  (2003)  ﬁnd  a 
small  eﬀect  of  the  sanctions  that  are  part  of  Danish  youth  unemployment  program.  Schneider 
(2008) studying beneﬁt  sanctions in Germany  ﬁnds no signiﬁcant eﬀect of  sanctions on reported 
reservation wages.  Hofmann (2008)  on the other hand  reports positive eﬀects of beneﬁt  sanctions 
on  the  employment  probability  of  West-German  unemployed. 
A  common  element in  these beneﬁt  sanction  studies is  that  they  are  restricted  to  the  analysis 
of  the  eﬀects  on  the duration  of  unemployment.  This is  not surprising  as  suitable data  to perform 
an analysis of post-unemployment jobs are often not  available.  Even in the context  of  much  more 
frequently  investigated  eﬀects  of  changes  in  level  or  duration  of  unemployment  beneﬁts  eﬀects 
on  post-unemployment  outcomes  are  rarely  considered.5  Our  paper  contributes  to  the  existing 
literature in at least three respects.  First,  we provide evidence  on the eﬀects  of beneﬁt  sanctions 
on  employment  stability  and  income  after  leaving  unemployment.  This  information  is  crucial  in 
assessing  the  net  eﬀects  of  beneﬁt  sanctions  on  earnings.  Second,  we  provide  a  detailed  analysis 
of  the  eﬀects  of beneﬁt  sanctions  on  exits  to  regular jobs,  and  of the  eﬀects  of beneﬁt  sanctions  on 
temporary  exits  to  unregistered  unemployment.  This  distinction  is  essential  in  thinking  about 
policies  that  activate  job  seekers  to  take  regular  jobs  as  opposed  to  policies  that  discourage 
labor  force  participation  altogether.  Third,  we  provide  an  exhaustive  set  of  simulations  of  the 
net  eﬀects  of  beneﬁt  sanctions  on  work  income. 
The  remainder  of this paper  are  structured  as follows.  Section 2 discusses institutional proce­
dures in the Swiss UI  system, both  concerning  unemployment beneﬁts and  sanction procedures. 
Section  3  presents  our  data  and  a  descriptive  analysis.  In  section  4  we  provide  the  set-up  of  the 
econometric analysis while in section 5  we provide our parameter estimates.  Section 6  concludes. 
2  Institutional  Procedures  in  the  Swiss  UI  System 
Job  seekers  are  entitled  to  unemployment  beneﬁts  if  they  meet  two  requirements.  First,  they 
must  have  paid  unemployment  insurance  taxes  for  at  least  six  months  in  the  two  years  prior 
to  registering  at  the public  employment  service (PES). The  contribution period is  extended  to 
4 Other  existing  empirical  literature  deal  almost  exclusively  with  the  ex-post  eﬀect  of  beneﬁt  sanctions.  One 
exception  is  the  paper  of  Svarer  (2007)  on  Danish  beneﬁt  sanctions.  Boone  et  al.  (2009)  present  results  on 
experiment  on  beneﬁt  sanctions  in  which  the  relevance  of  the  ex  ante  eﬀect  is  investigated. 
5 Three  recent  studies  which  do  look  at  the  post-unemployment  eﬀects  are  Card  et  al.  (2007),  Van  Ours 
and Vodopivec (2008),  and Lalive (2007).  These  studies  assess the  eﬀects  of  a  change  of potential duration  of 
UE  beneﬁts  in  Austria  and  Slovenia.  Both  ﬁnd  no  or  little  eﬀect  on  job  match  quality  or  wages.  Only  very 
recently  we became  aware  of Van den Berg  and Vikstr¨ om (2009),  who  also investigate post-unemployment  eﬀects 
of  unemployment beneﬁt sanctions.  Using Swedish data on post-unemployment jobs  - wage rates, hours of  work 
and  occupational  level  - they  ﬁnd  that  sanctions  lower  wages  and  hours  of  work  and  lead  to  a  lower  occupational 
level. 5  2 Institutional Procedures in the Swiss UI System 
12  months  for  those  individuals  who  have  been  registered  at  least  once  in  the  three  previous 
years.  Job  seekers  entering  the  labor  market  are  exempted  from  the  contribution  requirement  if 
they  have been in school, in prison, employed  outside of Switzerland  or have been taking  care of 
children.  Second, job  seekers  must possess the  capability  to fulﬁll  the  requirements  of  a  regular 
job  - they  must  be  ‘employable’.  If  a  job  seeker  is  found  not  to  be  employable  there  is  the 
possibility  to  collect  social  assistance.  Social  assistance  is  means  tested  and  relatively  generous. 
For instance,  social  assistance is  roughly 76%  of  unemployment beneﬁts for  a  single job  seeker 
with  no  other  sources  of income (OECD, 1999). 
The  potential  duration  of  unemployment  beneﬁts  is  2  years  for  individuals  who  meet  the 
contribution  and  employability  requirements.  After  this  period  of  two  years  unemployed  have 
to  rely  on  social  assistance.  The  marginal  replacement  ratio  is  80%  for  previous  income  up  to 
Sfr 4030;  70 % for income between Sfr 4030  and 8100;  and 0 % for income beyond Sfr 8100.  For 
job seekers  with  children, the  marginal  replacement  ratio is 80 % for income  up  to Sfr 8100;  and 
0  %  thereafter.  Job  seekers  have  to  pay  all  income  and  social  insurance  taxes  except  for  the 
unemployment  insurance  contribution. 
The  entitlement  criteria  during  the  unemployment  spell  concern  job  search  requirements 
and participation in  active labor  market programs.  Job  seekers  are  obliged  to  make  a  minimum 
number  of  applications  to  ‘suitable’  jobs  each  month.6  And,  they  are  obliged  to  participate  in 
active  labor  market  programs  during  the  unemployment  spell.7 
Compliance  with  the  job  search  and  program  participation  requirements  is  monitored  by 
roughly  2500  caseworkers  at  150  PES  oﬃces.  When  individuals  register  at  the  PES  oﬃce  they 
are  assigned  to  a  caseworker  on the basis  of  either previous industry, previous  occupation, place 
of  residence,  alphabetically  or  the  caseworker’s  availability.  Job  seekers  have  to  meet  at  least 
once  a  month  with  the  caseworker.  Compliance  with  the  job  search  requirements  is  enforced 
by  way  of  communication  with  the  human  resources  department  of  the  potential  employer. 
Participation  in  a  labor  market  program  is  monitored  by  the  caseworker  as  well  as  the  program 
staﬀ. 
In  this  paper  we  focus  on  beneﬁt  sanctions  because  of  noncompliance  with  eligibility  re­
quirements.  Sanctions  are  private  information  and  neither  caseworkers  nor  job  seekers  share 
information  on  beneﬁt  sanctions  with  potential  employers.8  The  process  until  a  sanction  is  im­
6 A  suitable job has to  meet four  criteria: (i)  the travel time from home to job  must  not  exceed  two hours, (ii) 
the  new job  contract  can  not  specify  longer hours  of  availability  than  are  actually paid, (iii)  the  new job  must  not 
be in a  ﬁrm which lays oﬀ and  re-hires for lower wages, and (iv)  the new job  must pay  at least 68%  of previous 
monthly  earnings.  Potential job  oﬀers  are  supplied by the public vacancy information  system  of the PES, from 
private temporary help  ﬁrms or from the job  seeker’s  own pool  of potential jobs.  Setting  the minimum number 
of job  applications is largely  at the discretion  of  the  caseworker  at the PES. 
7 The  exact  nature  and  scope  of  the  participation  requirement  is  determined  at  the  beginning  of  the  unem­
ployment  spell  and in  monthly  meetings  with the  caseworker.  Gerﬁn  and Lechner (2002)  and Lalive  et  al.  (2001) 
contain  background  information  on  and  an  evaluation  of  the  active  labor  market  programs. 
8 We  ignore  a  second  type  of  beneﬁt  sanctions  which  refer  to  ‘unnecessary’  job  loss  and  are  inﬂicted  upon 
workers  at  the  start  of  the  unemployment  spell.  The  legal  bases  for  the  sanction  procedure  are  mainly  given  by 
Art.  30  of  the Swiss UI Law (AVIG), Art.  44  and Art.  45  of  the  corresponding  UI Ordinance (AVIV)  and part D 
(”Sanctions”) of  the Decree  about Unemployment Beneﬁts (Kreisschreiben)  issued by  the Swiss State Secretariat 6  3 Data and Descriptive Analysis 
posed  can  be  divided  into  two  stages.  The  ﬁrst  stage  of  the  sanction  process  starts  when  some 
type  of  misbehavior  by  the  unemployed  is  detected  and  reported  to  the  cantonal  ministry  of 
economic  aﬀairs (CMEA)  either by  the  caseworker, by  a prospective  employer  or by  the  active 
labor market program staﬀ.  In this case the job seeker  must be notiﬁed  of the possible sanc­
tion  and  be  given  the  opportunity  to  clarify  why  he  or  she  was  not  able  to  fulﬁl  the  eligibility 
requirements (Article 4  of Federal Social Insurance Law).  Notiﬁcation is in  written form and 
contains the  reason for the sanction  and  the date  until  which  the  clariﬁcation is to be sent back. 
The average duration between the date job-seekers  are informed and the date until which the 
clariﬁcation  is  to  be  received  is  about  two  weeks. 
The  second  stage  of  the  sanction  process  starts  as  soon  as  the  clariﬁcation  period  ends. 
Depending  on  the  nature  of  the  clariﬁcation  provided  by  the  job  seeker  the  CMEA  decides 
whether  or  not  the  sanction  will  be  enforced.  If  there  is  suﬃcient  ground  for  an  excuse  the 
sanction  process  will  be  stopped.  If  the  excuse  is  deemed  not  valid,  the  sanction  is  enforced.  A 
beneﬁt  sanction  entails  a  100%  reduction  of  beneﬁts  for  a  maximum  duration  of  60  work  days.9 
Once  the  CMEA  has  decided  on  legitimacy  and  duration  of  the  sanction,  beneﬁt  payments 
are  stopped for time  speciﬁed in the warning letter.  The CMEA has to take this decision  within 
an  enforcement  period  of  six  months.  The  enforcement  period  for  the  beneﬁt  cut  starts  at  the 
ﬁrst day  of  the committed  noncompliance10 . Due to administrative delay  at the CMEA, there is 
no  strict  one-to-one  relationship  between  receiving  a  warning  letter  and  the  day  when  beneﬁts 
are  stopped.  Once  the  sanction  has  been  imposed,  the  unemployed  can  appeal  to  a  cantonal 
court  within  30  days  of  the  start  of  the  beneﬁt  sanction.  The  court  then  decides  whether  the 
sanction  conforms  to  current  legal  practice.  However,  it  takes  at  least  one  year  until  the  court 
reaches  a  decision.  Appeal  to  the  court  does  not  keep  the  CMEA  from  imposing  the  sanction. 
Job seekers  who leave  unemployment to  a job after  receiving the  warning do not have to pay 
the  beneﬁt  payments  due  to  a  beneﬁt  sanction. 
3  Data  and  Descriptive  Analysis 
3.1  Data  Sources  and  Data  Structure 
Our  study  is  based  on  data  from  the  Swiss  unemployment  register.  Our  main  sample  is  drawn 
from the  unemployment insurance  register database (UIR)  covering  the time period 1998-2003. 
It  contains information  on  all individuals  registering  with  the public  employment  service (PES) 
–  which  can be job  seekers  who are  eligible for unemployment beneﬁts but  also  other individuals 
asking  the PES for assistance.  The database also contains information on unemployment beneﬁt 
for Economic Aﬀairs seco.  The right  of job  seekers under suspicion  of  noncompliance to get the opportunity  to 
justify themselves is based  on Art.  42  of the Federal Social Insurance Law (ATSG)  and the paragraphs D8  and 
D9  of  the  above-mentioned  decree. 
9 Depending  on  the  nature  of  the  infringement,  there  are  four  levels  of  sanction  strengths;  in  workdays:  1  to 
15,  16  to  30,  31  to  60,  several  months  up  to  more  than  a  year. 
10 Exception:  The  enforcement  of  the  sanction  can  take  place  after  this  period  of  six  months  if  beneﬁts  in  the 
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payments,  as  well as  on beneﬁt  sanctions.  Information  on  sanctions is particularly rich  containing 
dates  of issue  of sanction  warnings  and  sanction impositions  as  well  as  on  the  reasons for imposing 
a  sanction  and  its  severity.  This  database  records  the  timing  of  events  at  daily  precision. 
We  merge  to  the  UIR  information  on  income  provided  from  the  social  security  adminis­
tration  (SSA)  covering  the  period  1993  to  2002.  This  database  contains  income  information 
on  individuals  which  are  eligible  for  the  public  retirement  pension  system.  The  data  provide 
information  on  earnings  but  also  on  non-labor  income  sources  such  as  unemployment  beneﬁts, 
disability beneﬁts,  military beneﬁts,  etc.  Earnings  and non-labor income information is  available 
in  monthly  precision.  The  SSA  does  not  record  information  on  hours  worked. 
From  the  merged UIR-SSA database,  we draw  an inﬂow  sample  covering individuals  entering 
the UIR between August 1998  and July 1999.  From these,  we  selected UI eligible job seekers 
aged  30  to  55  entering  unemployment  from  a  job  with  positive  earnings  in  the  year  prior  to 
entering  unemployment.  Moreover,  we  restrict  the  sample  to  individuals  who  are  entering  un­
employment  in  canton  with  reliable  information  on  warnings.  Cantons  diﬀer  in  terms  of  the 
number  of  actual  beneﬁt  reductions  that  are  preceded  by  a  warning  letter.  We  interpret  this  as 
missing information  on  warning letters because job  seeker  must be informed before  actual beneﬁt 
reductions  take  place.  The  analysis  focuses  on  cantons  where  almost  all  warnings  preceding  ac­
tual  beneﬁt  reductions  are  present11 .  While  this  sample  is  not  representative  for  Switzerland12 , 
this  sample  restriction  allows  understanding  both  the  eﬀects  of  a  warning  and  the  eﬀect  of  en-
forcing  the  beneﬁt  sanction.  The  resulting  sample  covers  23,961  spells.  The  median  duration 
of  unemployment is 153 days, 80.0%  of  the  unemployed found  a job, 19.8%  of  the  unemployed 
received  a  sanctions  warning,  while 8.4%  actually got  a beneﬁt  sanction imposed (see for  more 
details  Appendix  D). 
3.2  Descriptive  Analysis 
This  section  provides  a  descriptive  analysis  of  the  dynamics  in  the  Swiss  labor  market,  the 
sanction  process,  post-unemployment  earnings  and  the  duration  of  post-unemployment  spells. 
Figure  1  shows  the  empirical  Kaplan-Meier  estimates  of  the  transition  rate  from  unemployment 
to  employment  or  non-employment  and the  sanction  warnings  rate.  The  exit  rate  to  employment 
starts  at  a  rather low level  of 5 % per  month, peaks  at 14 % per  month  after 5  months  of job 
search  have  elapsed,  and  tapers  oﬀ  gradually  to  a  level  of  about  7%  per  month  after  10  months 
of  elapsed  unemployment  duration.  The  transition  rate  to  non-employment,  on  the  other  hand, 
doesn’t  show  a  peak  in  the  early  months  of  unemployment:  It  slightly  increases  in  the  ﬁrst  6 
11 These  cantons  are  Vaud,  Valais  and  Fribourg  in  the  West,  Solothurn  and  Uri  in  the  center,  and  Appenzell-
Innerrhoden  and  Graub¨ unden  in  the  East.  On  average,  5%  of  the  warnings  are  missing.  Cantons  with  at  least 
87.5%  warnings present  were  chosen for the sample.  We predict  warning  times for the remaining  5%  of  sanctioned 
job  seekers  using  a  tobit  regression  based  on  information  on  observed  characteristics.  Results  are  unaﬀected  by 
disregarding  these job  seekers. 
12 Using  the  mentioned  sampling  criteria  but  without  the  restriction  to  cantons  with  reliable  information  on 
warnings,  an  inﬂow  sample  of  90’897  spells  would  have  resulted.  Thus,  our  sample  covers  26.4%  of  the  inﬂow  in 
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months  from  1  to  2%  of  exits  to  non-employment.  From  then  on,  it  remains  on  this  level.  In 
general,  the  distribution  of  the  UE  durations  in  the  sample  (not  illustrated)  shows  the  well­
known  shape  with  a  peak  in  the  ﬁrst  four  months  of  unemployment  and  another  peak,  though 
smaller,  at  the  end  of  the  normal  beneﬁt  entitlement  period  after  two  years. 
The  third  hazard  rate  in  Figure  1  is  the  sanction  warning  rate.  The  sanction  warning 
rate  measures  the  probability  of  a  sanction  warning  in  the  next  month  for  those  who  are  still 
unemployed  at  the  start  of  each  month.  The  sanction  warnings  rate  shows  a  peak  of  almost  5% 
in  the  second  month  of  UE,  gradually  decreasing  afterwards.  The  median  duration  until  the 
ﬁrst  warning  was  77  days. 
The bottom graph  of Figure 1  shows the enforcement hazard, i.e.  the rate at which  sanctions 
are  enforced  among  those  who  have  been  warned.  Clearly,  there  is  a  strong  tendency  to  enforce 
a  sanction  in  the  ﬁrst  month  after  giving  the  warning.  The  enforcement  hazard  peaks  at  about 
23 % in the  ﬁrst month, and decreases strongly  to 7 % in month 2, and  more gradually  to levels 
below  5  %  per  month  thereafter.  This  evidence  suggests  on  one  hand  that  at  least  one  quarter 
of  all  warnings  immediately  lead  to  withdrawal  of  beneﬁts.  On  the  other  hand,  the  fact  that 
the  enforcement  hazard  is  substantially  below  100  %  in  the  ﬁrst  month  after  the  warning  also 
suggests  that  not  all  warnings  are  actually  enforced. 
Figure  2  gives  insights  into  the  stability  of  the  individual’s  post-unemployment  situation. 
Recall  that job  seekers leave  unemployment either directly for a job  or they leave unemployment 
for  a  period  of  temporary  or  permanent  non-employment.  The  SSA  allows  constructing  infor­
mation  on the duration of  the  ﬁrst  employment or non-employment spell  after leaving  registered 
unemployment (in  months) between  the  calendar date  a job  seeker leaves  unemployment  and  the 
end  of the SSA  observation period (December 2002).  Employment  and  non-employment  spells 
which  are  on-going  in  December  2002  are  treated  as  right  censored.  Employment  spells  are 
terminated  by  a  transition  into  non-employment  whereas  non-employment  spells  are  terminated 
by  a transition into employment.  Consider  ﬁrst job seekers who leave unemployment directly 
for employment.  The  ﬁrst employment  spell  after exit lasts 25  months in median (mean: 24). 
The  employment  exit  hazard  peaks  after  8  months  at  6%  exit  rate  from  the  ﬁrst  employment 
period.  People  in  employment  spells  beyond  one  year  show  a  propensity  to  exit  of  about  1 
to  2%  per  month  –  a  sign  of  high  stability  of  employment  relations.  Turning  to  job  seekers 
who  leave  unemployment  to  temporary  or  permanent  non-employment,  we  ﬁnd  that  their  ﬁrst 
non-employment  spell lasts for 11  months in  median (mean:  18).  There is  an important group 
of  short  non-employment  spells  of  1  to  2  months  that  drives  up  the  respective  hazard.  This 
group  seems  to  be  confronted  with  a  very  short  unstable  transition  period  until  reemployment 
is  established.  Later,  the  hazard  gradually  decreases,  and  after  15  months  of  duration,  the 
non-employment  exit  hazard  stabilizes  on  approximately  the  same  level  as  the  employment  exit 
hazard. 
The  econometric  analysis  will  provide  evidence  on  the  causal  impact  on  earnings  in  the 
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leaving  unemployment  for  job  seekers  who  leave  unemployment  directly  for  a  paid  job.  We 
analyze  earnings  using  hazards  because  this  brings  a  number  of  methodological  advantages  – 
mainly in terms of  a more  ﬂexible (and less parametric)  econometric design.  We discuss these 
(and some  issues  on  the  interpretation  of  earnings  hazards)  in  the  corresponding  econometrics 
section 4.2.  The middle graph of Figure 2 displays the hazard  of leaving  the earnings distribution 
for the  ﬁrst post-unemployment  month grouped in intervals  of 500 CHF (about 330  e).  The  one 
month  earnings hazard  – i.e.  the (instantaneous) probability  of  earning  an amount  y  conditional 
on  earning  at  least  y  –  is  steadily  increasing  over  the  support  of  the  earnings  distribution;  at  a 
level  of  5000  CHF  it  reaches  about  30%  per  500  CHF.  This  means  that  individuals  who  earn  at 
least  5000  CHF  have  a  probability  of  earning  between  5000  CHF  and  5499  CHF  of  30%.  The 
observation that the proportion of people  ”leaving”  the earnings distribution markedly increases 
until  this peak  reﬂects the fact that  earnings levels  around 5000 CHF  are the most frequent  ones 
for  individuals  in  their  ﬁrst  employment  month  after  unemployment  exit.  The  high  ”exit  rate” 
from the  earnings distribution  of  about 25% per 500 CHF  thereafter  shows that  earnings higher 
5000  CHF  are  the  less  and  less  frequent  in  the  e  group. 
A  similar  shape  of  the  earnings hazard  can be found  when  analyzing  the  sum  of  earnings  over 
24  months  after  unemployment  exit for job  seekers  who  start  working  immediately  after leaving 
unemployment,  see  the  bottom  graph  of  Figure  2.  This  hazard  peaks  at  15%  towards  125,000 
CHF,  reﬂecting  the fact  that  cumulative  earnings  of  a bit  more  than 100,000  CHF  over  two years 
are  the  most  common  ones  for  the  e  group  of  our  sample.  Then, the hazard gradually  decreases 
down  to  a  level  of  about  10%.  Earnings  sums  beyond  200,000  CHF  are  very  rare  extreme  cases 
(which  will  be  censored  for  estimation).  Extending  the  analyzed  subsample  to  all  individuals 
who  realized positive  earnings during  these two years (corresponds to  estimated Model IV later 
on),  we  observe  almost  exactly  the  same  shape  of  the  hazard.  This  is  not  surprising  since  the 
two  considered groups do  not diﬀer tremendously  in their  composition (see discussions  on that 
in  the  econometrics  section  4.2  and  the  results  section  5.3). 
The  ﬁnal  piece  of  descriptive  evidence  concerns  earnings  histories  of  individuals  who  never 
experience  a  sanction,  individuals  who  receive  a  warning  but  this  warning  does  not  lead  to 
an  actual  reduction  in  beneﬁts,  and  individuals  who  receive  a  warning  and  the  beneﬁt  cut  is 
also  realized.  Recall  that  our  earnings  data  span  the  time  period  1993  to  2002.  This  allows 
constructing  average (deﬂated)  earnings in  the 5 years prior  to  entering  unemployment  and in 
the  2  years  after  leaving  unemployment  by  sanction  status  (top  graph  of  Figure  3).  Results 
indicate  that  non-sanctioned  and  sanctioned  diﬀer  tremendously  with  respect  to  earnings  levels. 
Whereas  non-sanctioned  earn  almost  3500  CHF  per  month13,  individuals  with  either  a  warning 
or  an  actual  beneﬁt  reduction  earned  on  the  order  of  2750  CHF  per  month. 
13 When  interpreting  the  absolute  earnings  levels  in  this  and  the  previous  ﬁgures,  one  has  to  consider  that:  (i) 
individuals  may  be partly  employed, partly  non-employed in their  earnings history; (ii)  also part-time  workers  are 
in  the  sample; (iii)  the  sample  contains  all  the individuals  who gained  at least  once  employment  earnings in  the 
last 12  months before inﬂow into  unemployment (with  no  restrictions  on being in the labor force  or  not in the 
years  before).  This  explains  the  low  level  of  average  employment  earnings  reported  in  the  graph. 10  4 Econometric Analysis 
Interestingly,  while  the  earnings  gap  between  individuals  who  were  warned  only  and  those 
who  are  warned  and  enforced is  visible 5 years before  entering  unemployment,  the gap disappears 
around  the  time  when  individuals  enter  unemployment.  This  suggests  that  while  selectivity  is 
important in  comparing the  non-sanctioned to  either  warned or  warned plus  enforced individuals, 
direct  comparisons  within  the  latter  two  groups  are  more  informative.  Moreover,  enforcing  the 
sanction  appears  to  lower  post-unemployment  monthly  earnings  for  the  group  with  a  sanction 
by  about  200  CHF  in  comparison  with  the  warned  group.  This  is  a  ﬁrst  descriptive  hint  that 
beneﬁt  sanctions  may  reduce post-unemployment  earnings.  But  this picture  could be  misleading 
since  the  descriptive  eﬀect  may  be  confounded  by  unobserved  characteristics  and  endogenous 
selectivity.  These  will  be  taken  into  account  in  the  estimated  models.  The  bottom  graph  of 
Figure 3 distinguishes the earnings paths with  respect to the exit destination  – into employment 
or  nonemployment.  This  ﬁgure  supports  the  previous  one,  pointing  to  an  increased  earnings 
diﬀerence  between  the  sanctioned  and  non-sanctioned  after  unemployment  exit  for  both,  the 
exit  to  employment  and  to  non-employment  group.14 
4  Econometric  Analysis 
Our  dataset  allows  the  use  of  detailed  duration  analysis  methods.  In  particular,  we  use  a 
multi-state  duration  model  that  combines  information  on  the  timing  of  beneﬁt  sanctions  with 
information  on  unemployment  dynamics  and  the  quality  of  post-unemployment  jobs.  As  we 
explain in  more detail  below  we  estimate  four  models.  Model I is  the baseline  model in  which  we 
jointly estimate  transition  rates  from  unemployment  to  employment  and  out  of  the  labor  force, 
transition  rates  to  the  warning  state  and  transition  rates  to  enforcement.  Model  II  adds  to  this 
estimates of post-unemployment outcomes, i.e.  employment stability  and durations of  out  of  the 
labor force  spells.  In Models III  and IV  we  also include various  measures  of post-unemployment 
earnings. 
4.1  Modeling  Individual’s  Event  Histories 
As  a  base  for  the  evaluation  of  sanction  eﬀects  on  post-unemployment  outcomes,  we  model 
the  event  history  of  an  individual  during  and  after  unemployment.  As  depicted  in  Figure  4, 
the  individual  experiences  multiple  stages,  starting  at  t0,  the  entry  into  unemployment.  The 
ﬁrst  selection  is  the  treatment  assignment:  to  be  sanctioned  or  not.  Since  we  dispose  of  non­
experimental data,  this  assignment  is  non-random  and  endogenous.  It  comprises  two  stages,  the 
warning (subscript  w) that  a  sanction  investigation  has  started,  and  later  the  possible  sanction 
enforcement  (s).  Thus,  at  the  point  of  exit  from  unemployment  (T),  the  individual  can  be 
14 Note  that  the  upward-tendency  of  the  earnings  paths  in  the  last  year  before  unemployment  entry  in  the  two 
graphs  in  Figure  3  is  generated  by  the  sampling:  The  fact  that  having  at  least  once  positive  earnings  in  the  year 
before  unemployment  entry  is  one  of  the  conditions  of  being  sampled  leads  to  a  higher  proportion  of  individuals 
in  employment  in  this  year.  Consequently,  average  earnings  are  higher.  This  causes  no  problems  for  estimation 
later  on  because  we  will  control  for  the  full  past  earnings  and  employment  history. 11  4 Econometric Analysis 
potentially in three diﬀerent  states (s,  w  or  not  sanctioned).  In  addition,  unemployment  spells 
can  be  censored  if  they  last  longer  than  720  days. 
By  T,  the  third  selection  takes place,  individuals  exit  to  employment (e) or  non-employment 
(ne).  Employment is deﬁned in our data by  a positive value of  employment earnings in a speciﬁc 
month15 .  Beyond  T,  we  observe  the  post-unemployment  outcome  –  in  the  form  of  subsequent 
(non-)employment (tm/tnm) or  of  earnings (y)  over  a  certain  period.  Due  to  the  fact  that  our 
post-unemployment  observation  period  ends  by  31  December  2002,  we  analyze  outcomes  up  to 
two  years  after  unemployment  exit.  There  is  a  very  small  group  that  may  be  censored  in  these 
outcomes: Those who enter  at the end  of the inﬂow period  and  exploit (almost)  fully  the two 
year’s  beneﬁt  availability  can  only  be  observed  for  1.5. 
We implement  the  event histories  of individuals by using  a  competing  risk  mixed proportional 
hazard (MPH)  framework  with dynamic treatment  eﬀects.  Work  of Abbring  and  van den Berg 
(2003b)  shows  that  identiﬁcation  of  such  models  is  given  under  an  MPH  structure  and  weak 
regularity  conditions.  To  avoid  parametric  assumptions  as  far  as  possible,  we  model  the  MPH 
using  a  ﬂexible,  piecewise-constant  duration  dependence  function  and  specify  a  discrete  mass 
points  distribution  for  the  unobserved  heterogeneity. 
There  are  two  central  assumptions  for  the  nonparametric  identiﬁcation  of  causal  eﬀects 
of  dynamic  treatments  (Abbring  and  van  den  Berg  2003a).  The  ﬁrst  assumption  states  that 
job  seekers  do  not  anticipate  a  warning  or  the  actual  reduction  of  a  beneﬁt  sanction.  This 
assumption  is  crucial  to  rule  out  changes  in  behavior  before  the  actual  treatment  takes  place. 
No  anticipation  is  clearly  justiﬁed  in  the  present  context.  While  job  seekers  may  have  some 
information  regarding  the  monitoring  technology  used  by  caseworkers,  the  can  not  anticipate 
the  actual  date  of  receiving  the  warning  letter.  This  is  because  issuing  the  warning  letter  takes 
several  steps.  First,  caseworkers,  ﬁrms,  or  program  staﬀ  need  to  detect  non-compliance  and 
decide  to  report  it.  Second,  the  oﬃcial  at  the  CMEA  will  look  into  the  case  and  decide  whether 
non-compliance is present.  Third, job  seekers  can  not  anticipate the  actual day  of  receiving  the 
letter  because  administrative  delays  are  introducing  a  strong  degree  of  uncertainty.  Moreover, 
job seekers  also  can  not  anticipate  the  day  when  beneﬁts  are  reduced.  Justiﬁcation  introduces 
uncertainty  in  the  with  regard  to  whether  the  warning  leads  to  a  beneﬁt  reduction.  Moreover, 
even if justiﬁcation is  not  valid, the CMEA  can take  up  to 6  months  until the beneﬁt  sanction 
is  actually  enforced. 
The  second  key  identifying  assumption  is  that  the  hazards  of  leaving  unemployment  have 
a mixed proportional hazard structure (MPH). This assumption states that  selectivity  can be 
modeled  assuming time invariant  unobserved heterogeneity  that is independent  of  observed  char­
acteristics.  The assumption of time invariance appears warranted (referring to individual  speciﬁc 
characteristics  such  as  motivation for job  search,  etc.).  In  contrast,  the  assumption  of indepen­
dence  between  observed  characteristics  appears  to  be  more  questionable.  However,  note  that 
15 In addition,  employment earnings must be higher than the amount of  additional  social transfer (if the indi­
vidual  gets  some).  Thus,  individuals  mainly  relying  on  social  transfer  are  considered  as  non-employed. � 
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while  correlation between  observed  characteristics  and  unobserved  characteristics is likely  to bias 
parameter  estimates  attached  to  control  variables,  the  bias  to  the  treatment  eﬀects  are  likely  to 
be less  severe  since  selectivity  is  explicitly  taken into  account.  Assuming  an MPH  structure also 
means  that  observed  covariates  shift  the  hazard  rate  proportionately.  Proportionality  is  one  of 
the  most  common  assumptions in duration  studies  and  earlier  work  on Switzerland  suggests  that 
it is  not driving  results  on the  eﬀects  of dynamic treatments (Lalive,  van Ours  and Zweim¨ uller 
2008). 
To  expose  the  model  structure,  te  denotes  the  duration  of  unemployment  until  a  paid  exit 
from  unemployment,  tne  denotes  the  time  from  entering  unemployment  until  leaving  paid  un­
employment  to  an  unpaid  exit  state,  tw  denotes  the  time  from  entering  unemployment  until 
a  sanction  warning  takes  place,  and  ts  denotes  the  time  from  a  sanction  warning  until  an  ac­
tual  beneﬁt  reduction  takes  place.  The  treatment  indicators  can  then  be  deﬁned  as  follows. 
Dw  ≡  I(tw  <  min(te,tne)) identiﬁes job  seekers  who  experience beneﬁt  reduction before leaving 
unemployment.  Ds  ≡  I(tw  +  ts  <  min(te,tne))  identiﬁes job  seekers  who  experience  a beneﬁt 
reduction  before  leaving  unemployment.  The  starting  point  to  set  up  the  duration  model  is  a 
speciﬁcation  where  the  treatment  variables  Dw  and  Ds  indicate  warning  and  sanction  enforce­
ment.  The  unemployment  exit  hazard  to  destination  l  ∈ {e,ne} is  then: 
θl(tl|x,r,p,Dwl,Dsl,vl) =  λl(tl)exp(x ′ βl  +  r ′ αl  +  p ′ γl  +  δwlDwl  +  δslDsl  +  vl)  (1) 
λl(t) stands for individual duration dependence in  our proportional hazard  model,  x  represents  a 
vector  of  observable individual  characteristics,  r  is  a  vector  of public  employment  service dummy 
variables,  p  is  a  vector  of  controls  for  state  dependence16  and  vl  represents  the  unobserved 
heterogeneity  that  accounts for possible selectivity  in the  exit process (see  subsection 4.3 for the 
empirical  speciﬁcation  of  unobserved  heterogeneity  and  Appendix  D  for  a  detailed  description 
of  the  observables).  The  parameters  δwl  and  δsl  measure  the  eﬀect  that  a  warning  and  an 
enforcement  have  on  the  exit  rate  from  UE.  Note  that  δsl  measures  the  additional  eﬀect  of 
enforcement  relative  to the  eﬀect  of  a  warning.  A common  approach to  modeling ﬂexible duration 
dependence is the  use  of  a  step  function (piecewise-constant duration  model) 
λl(tl) =  exp(  (λl,k  ·  Ik(tl))  (2) 
k 
where  k  = 0,.., 3  is  a  subscript  for  time-intervals  and  Ik(t)  are  time-varying  dummy  variables 
that  are  one  in  subsequent  time-intervals.  Taking  into  account  the  shape  of  the  descriptive 
hazards (see  section 3.2)  and the fact that for  our Swiss data  we  observe  median UE durations 
of  a  bit  less/more  than  half  a  year  for  the  exit  to  e/ne  groups,  we  ﬁx  the  four  time  intervals 
as  follows:  1-40/1-90  days,  40-210/90-270  days,  210-360/270-480  days  and  360/480  and  more 
16 We control for the individual’s labor market history  over the past  ﬁve years: past earnings, past employment. 
For  details,  see  Appendix  D. � 
� 
� 
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days.  Because  estimation  includes  as  well  a  constant  term,  normalization  is  necessary  which  is 
achieved  by  setting  λl,0 = 0 (i.e.  the  constant  measures the baseline  exit  rate in interval 0). 
In  a  similar  way  we  can  model  the  rate  by  which  individuals  are  warned  about  a  possible 
sanction  and  the  rate  by  which  a  sanction  is  enforced  at  time  t  conditional  on  x,  r,  p  and  v  as 
θh(th|x,r,p,vh) =  λh(th)exp(x ′ βh  +  r ′ αh  +  p ′ γh  +  vh)  (3) 
where  for  h  =  {w,s},  λh(th)  =  exp(  k(λh,k  ·  Ik(th))  with  normalization  λh,0  =  0  and  vh 
representing  the  respective  unobserved  heterogeneity.17 
Using the  elements  outlined above,  this leads  us to the following likelihood function (replacing 
the  conditioning  on  x,r,v,p  by  an  index  i  and  suppressing  notation  on  the  treatments): 





cne  L  =  w,i(tw)Sw,i(tw s,i(ts)Ss,i(ts e,i(te)Se,i(te ne,i(tne)Sne,i(tne)Lp,i  dG(v)  (4) 
i=1  v 
where  cm  (m  ∈ {e,ne,w,s}) designates  a  censoring indicator, being 1 if the  respective duration is 
tm not  censored,  and  zero  otherwise,  and  Sm,i(tm) ≡  exp(−  0  θm,i(z)dz) is  a  time-to-event  speciﬁc 
”survivor”  function,  v  is  a  vector  of  unobserved heterogeneity  components (further discussed in 
section  4.3),  and  G(v) is the  corresponding  cumulative joint distribution.  Note that 4  accounts 
for  both  right-censoring  and  the  competing  risks  nature  of  unemployment  exits. 
The  most important  element in (4) is  Lp,i  containing information  on  the individual likelihood 
contribution  of  the post-unemployment period.  This  element  of  our  model  varies, depending  on 
which  post-unemployment  outcome  we  evaluate.  In  our  baseline  Model  I,  we  set  Lp,i  =  1  thus 
disregarding  information  on  post-unemployment  outcomes.  In  the  following,  we  describe  the 
Models  II  to  IV  that  incorporate  diﬀerent  measures  of  post-unemployment  outcomes. 
4.2  Modeling  the  post-unemployment  outcome  measures 
4.2.1  Employment  stability 
Our  Model  II  is  designed  to  evaluate  the  eﬀects  of  beneﬁt  sanctions  on  the  employment  stability 
in  the  post-unemployment  period.  We  analyze  the  impact  of  being  sanctioned  or  not  on  the 
duration  of  the  ﬁrst  employment  or  nonemployment  spell  starting  right  after  unemployment 
exit. 
Following  Figure 4, (non-censored)  individuals  enter into  a  spell  of  subsequent  employment, 
described  by  the  duration  tm,  or  into  subsequent  nonemployment,  tnm.  Due  to  the  fact  that 
the  SSR  data  we  use  are  of  monthly  precision,  we  model  the  respective  hazards  in  a  discrete 
manner.  The  discrete  hazards  for  to  (with  o  =  {m,nm})  can  be  represented  as  the  diﬀerence 
17 Based  on  descriptive  analysis  of  the  duration  distributions  and  hazards,  duration  splits  to  implement  the 
piecewise-constant  design  are  set  to  30/90/240  days  for  the  warnings  hazard  and  10/30/150  days.  Note  that 
enforcements  usually  take place  already  10 to 20 days  after the  warning, therefore the  early  splits (see  section 3.2 
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between  two  survivor  functions  of  two  consecutive  months,  be  it  to  − 1  and  to,  divided  by  the 
survivor  of  the  earlier  month.18  Thus,  the  discrete-time  hazard  is  the  probability  of  failure  in 
the  interval  between  two  consecutive  months,  conditioned  on  the  probability  of  surviving  to  at 
least  the  earlier  month. 
The  corresponding  likelihood  contribution  consists  therefore  in 
So(to  − 1|x,r,p,Dwo,Dso,tu,vo) − So(to|x,r,p,Dwo,Dso,tu,vo)  (5) 
if the  observation is  not censored  and in  So(to|x,r,p,Dwo,Dso,tu,vo) if censored.  The  survivors19 
are  modeled  in  the  same  way  as  described  in  the  last  subsection.  In  the  post-unemployment 
period,  the  treatment  eﬀect  results  in  a  constant  upward  or  downward  shift  of  the  respective 
hazard. 
Note  that  we  control  here  as  well  for  the  realized  duration  of  unemployment,  tu  (= 
min(te,tne)).  To  allow  for  nonlinear  unemployment  duration  dependence  we  add  a  polyno­
)20  mial  function  g(ln  tu to  the  controls.  This  implies  for  the  complete  likelihood  functions  – 
which  describe  the  joint  distribution  of  tw,  ts,  te,  tne,  tm  and  tnm  –  that  we  claim  indepen­
dence  between  the  distributions  of  these  durations  conditional  on  x,r,p,Dw,Ds,  the  respective 
unobserved heterogeneity  v  and duration  tu  in  the  case  of  the  two post-unemployment processes. 
Taking the  two  options  of  employment (m) or  non-employment (nm) together,  the individual 
likelihood  contribution  of the post-unemployment period (suppressing  again the conditioning) 
is 
� �ce )1−cm Lp,i  = [Sm(tm  − 1) − Sm(tm)]
cm  Sm(tm · 
� �cne  )1−cnm  [Snm(tnm  − 1) − Snm(tnm)]
cnm  Snm(tnm (6) 
Since these  contributions  are  at the third  stage  of  the  selection (see Figure 4), double-censoring 
occurs.  First,  censored  employment  or  non-employment durations (with  cm  or  cnm  equal  zero) 
may  occur  since  the  post-unemployment  observation  window  is  restricted  to  the  end  of  2002. 
Second,  uncensored  unemployment  spells  with  ce  or  cne  equal  1  are  censored  in  the  other  exit 
destination  and  therefore  as  well  in  the  respective  post-unemployment  process.  Finally,  in  the 
case  of  a  censored  unemployment  spell,  ce  and  cne  are  zero  and  Lp,i  equals  1.21 
18 Note that  we  again  assume that the hazard  of leaving  employment  and  the hazard  of leaving  non-employment 
have  an  MPH  structure.  This  assumption  is  crucial  for  identiﬁcation. 
19 Based  on  descriptive  analysis  of  the  duration  distributions  and  hazards,  duration  splits  to  implement  the 
piecewise-constant  design  are  set  to  5/10/24  months  for  the  employment  process  and  to  2/6/16  months  for  the 
non-employment  process. 
20 We  add  polynomial  terms  of  ln  tu  up  to  the  sixth  power. 
21 19,149  of  total  23,961  spells  (i.e.  79.9%)  exit  from  unemployment  to  employment  (ce  =  1),  2985  (12.5%) 
exit to  non-employment (cne  = 1);  1827 (7.6%)  exhibit  censored  unemployment durations.  After  exit, 42.5%  and 
34.9%  of the respective populations are censored in their  ﬁrst employment/non-employment spell (i.e.  cm  = 0  or 
cnm  =  0).  These  high  censoring  rates  point  to  the  fact  that  remarkable  parts  of  the  sample  show  stable  labor 
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4.2.2  Post-unemployment  earnings 
Our  Models  III  and  IV  feature  earnings  as  an  outcome  measure  in  the  post-unemployment 
period.  We  evaluate  the  eﬀects  of  beneﬁt  sanctions  on  the  earnings  in  the  ﬁrst  (complete) 
month  after  unemployment  exit  and  on  the  sum  of  earnings  over  the  ﬁrst  24  months  after 
unemployment  exit  (y1  and  y24,  respectively).  Thus,  we  generate  measures  that  incorporate 
endogenous  changes  of  the labor  market  status during  the  respective periods (see Klepinger  et 
al.  2002 for a similar design).  These outcome  measures are global in the sense that they  capture 
the  eﬀects  of  sanction  warnings  and  enforcement  on  the  duration  of  employment,  on  the  level  of 
wages,  and  on  hours  worked  for  individuals  leaving  unemployment. 
We  use  an MPH  structure  to  model  the post-unemployment  earnings distribution for  at least 
two reasons.  First, the MPH model  structure is more  ﬂexible than assuming  a speciﬁc parametric 
distribution  –  e.g.,  log-normality  –  by  applying  the  same  ﬂexible  hazard  function  design  as  for 
the durations above.  Second,  results from the duration literature  show that the earnings hazard 
model  is  identiﬁed.22  We  extend  this  approach  additionally  in  two  respects:  First,  we  use  this 
multiple  states  hazard  framework  with  earnings  to  evaluate  a  speciﬁc  treatment.  Accordingly, 
we introduce dynamic treatment eﬀects in this context.  Second, we handle the double selectivity 
problem  that  is  implied  by  our  framework:  Selection  at  the  entry  into  the  two  sanction  states 
and  at  the  exit  from those  states into (non-)employment. 
The  earnings hazard describes the (instantaneous)  probability  of  earning  y  conditional  on 
earning  at least  y.  Thus, like  the  unemployment exit hazard,  the  earnings hazard has  an  upward­
directed  interpretation:  the  probability  of  generating  an  earnings  level  of  exactly  y  conditional 
on  earning  at  least  y.  What  are  the  implications  of  assuming  that  the  earnings  hazard  follow 
an  MPH  structure?  In  case  earnings  are  exactly  exponentially  distributed,  the  MPH  structure 
implies  that  both  observed  and  unobserved  characteristics  change  log  expected  earnings  in  an 
additive fashion  – quite similar to modeling log  earnings using linear models.23  In  case  earnings 
are  not  exponential,  assuming  an MPH  structure generally implies  modeling proportionate  shifts 
on the integrated  earnings hazards.  Moreover, it  can be shown that assuming  an MPH  structure 
implies  that  the  eﬀect  of  beneﬁt  sanctions  on  mean  earnings  as  well  as  on  all  the  quantiles  of 
earnings  are  of  opposite  sign  as  the  eﬀect  on  the  hazard.24 
22 The  idea  to  model  wages,  earnings  or  income  in  a  hazard  framework  ﬁrst  appeared  in  Donald  et  al.  (2000); 
Cockx  and Picchio (2008)  extended it by  introducing  competing  risks,  unobserved heterogeneity  and  state depen­
dence. 
23  λ
−1  ′  To  see  this,  note  that  E(T|x,v) =  0  exp(−x β  − v) where  λ0  is  the  baseline  hazard. 
24 To  see  this,  suppose  that  earnings  without  sanction  are  Y0 with hazard  θ0(y|x) =  λ(y)exp(x 
′ β) and  Y1 follow  a 
distribution  with hazard  θ1(y|x) =  θ0(y|x)exp(δ) where  δ  is  the  eﬀect  of  a  beneﬁt  sanction  on  the  earnings  hazard.  �  ∞  � 
Since  E(T1|x) =  0  exp(−
y 
0  θ1(z|x)dz)dy,  it  follows  E(T1|x) < E(T0|x)  ⇐⇒  δ >  0.  Moreover,  note  that  the  α 
quantile  treatment  eﬀect  is  y 
α 
1  − y 
α 
0  =  Λ
−1(−log(1 − α)exp(−δ)) − Λ
−1(−log(1 − α)) where  Λ
−1 
0  0 0  () is  the  inverse 
of  the  integrated  hazard  of  the  counterfactual  earnings  distribution.  This  means  that  y 
α 
1  − y 
α 




1()  is  a  monotonically  increasing  function.  Finally,  consider  the  log  likelihood  ratio  of  earnings  with 
sanction  and  counterfactual  earnings  without  sanction,  i.e.  lnf1 (y|x)/f0(y|x) =  δ−(exp(δ)−1)Λ0(y).  This  shows 
that  the  likelihood  ratio  satisﬁes  the  monotone  likelihood  ratio  property,  and  beneﬁt  sanctions  shift  the  earnings 
distribution  in  the  sense  of  ﬁrst  order  stochastic  dominance. 16  4 Econometric Analysis 
For  the  earnings  data,  we  implement  the  estimation  of  sanction  eﬀects  on  earnings  in  the 
same  way  as  in  Model  II  one  above  –  we  just  replace  to  by  yj,  i.e.  by  one  of  the  mentioned 
earnings  measures  (whereby  j  =  {1,24}).  Since  the  earnings  data  are  considered  as  being 
continuous  we  use  continuous  hazards.  Depending  on  the  descriptive  hazards  and  medians  of 
the  respective  measures,  we  deﬁne  suitable  splits  of  the  earnings  values  to  design  the  respective 
(yj)25  piecewise-constant  earnings-level-dependence  functions  λyj . 
The Model III results in  an individual post-unemployment likelihood  contribution (suppress­
ing  conditioning)  of 
�ce  �  cyj  Lp,i  =  θ (yj)Syj(yj)  (7)  yj 
Model IV is very  similar in the design  – except that it uses diﬀerent exit destinations.  Going 
back  to  Figure  4,  this  means  that  at  time  T  individuals  are  not  separated  by  exiting  to  e  or  to 
ne  as  described  in  Model  III,  but  the  exit  destinations  are  now  y24  >  0  and  y24  =  0.  So,  we 
separate  individuals  with  a  sum  of  earnings  over  24  months  which  is  positive  from  those  with 
zero  sum  of  earnings.  The  second  group  represents  the  part  of  the  sample  that  permanently 
exits  labor  force  over  24  months.  The  comparison  of  the  Models  III  and  IV  allows  interesting 
statements  about  the  eﬀect  of  sanctions  on  individuals  who  temporarily  exit  to  nonemployment, 
thus who reenter labor force during  the 24  months (i.e.  the subgroup  which has diﬀerent exit 
destinations in the two  models).  See  more  on that comparison in the  respective  results  subsection 
5.3.  Consequently,  the  likelihood  contribution  for  Model  IV  has  the  same  structure  as  the  one 
for  Model  III: 
� �cy cy24t Lp,i  =  θy24t  (y24t)Sy24t(y24)  (8) 
where  cy  represent  the  non-censoring  indicator,  being  one  if  y24 >  0.  Note  that  in  the  Models 
III and IV we estimate  ﬁve processes.  There is no sixth process here (like in Model II)  since 
individuals  exiting  to  nonemployment  do  not  dispose  of  an  earnings  distribution26 . 
As  described  for  Model  II,  the  post-unemployment  process  is  again  confronted  with  double 
censoring.  First,  cyj/cy24t  can  be  zero  for  two  reasons:  earnings  can’t  be  observed  over  24 
months27 after  unemployment  exit (since this  was late in the  observation  window);  in  addition, 
earnings  are  right-censored  at  10,000/200,000  CHF  over  1/24  months  due  to  the  top  coding  of 
25 The earnings measure for the  ﬁrst month after unemployment (y1)  exhibits  a  median  of  3,871  CHF  for  the 
group  which  exited from  unemployment to  employment (e).  The  earnings  splits  for  y1  are  set  to  1500/3000/4500 
CHF.  For  earnings  over  24  months  –  i.e.  y24  –  we  ﬁnd  a  median  of  87,698  CHF  for  the  e  group.  The  median  of 
y24  for  all individuals  with positive  earnings  sums  over 24  months (Model IV, the  y24 >  0  group)  is  83,542  CHF. 
Since the descriptive  earnings (y24) hazards  for  the  e  and  the  y24 >  0 group  in the Models III  and IV  are  of  a  very 
similar  shape,  we  apply  the  same  earnings  splits  for  these  two  models:  They  amount  to  50000/100000/150000 
CHF. 
26 In Model IV,  this is  true in general  since  we deﬁned  the  exit destinations by distinguishing  y24 >  0  vs.  y24 = 0. 
In  Model  III,  some  individuals  in  the  ne  group  have  a  positive  earnings  sum,  those  who  only  temporarily  exited 
labor  force  –  but  not  all. 
27 In  the  1-month-case,  there  is  no  such  censoring  for  y1. 17  4 Econometric Analysis 
social  security  earnings.  In  our  data,  very  small  proportions  had  to  be  censored  due  to  these 
28  reasons . The second hierarchy  of  censoring (ce/cy) is  the  same  as  for  Model  II. 
Note that we divide all  the earnings measures by 1000, in order to  avoid  extreme  value levels 
in  estimation.  Again,  we  condition  on  the  unemployment  duration  by  adding  the  polynomial 
g(ln tu)29 to  the  controls. 
4.3  Dealing  with  multiple  selectivity 
Our evaluation setup implies that we have to deal  with  the issue of  multiple selectivity.  First, the 
sorting into the treatment is endogenous  – the assignment  of  sanction warnings and  enforcements 
is  obviously  non-random.  Second, the  exit from (treated  or  non-treated)  unemployment into  a 
state  of  employment  or  nonemployment (or  y24 >  0  vs.  y24 = 0  for  Model  IV)  is  driven  as  well 
by  individual  characteristics,  thus  by  a  non-random  process.  In  both  cases,  we  end  up  with  a 
post-selection population  that potentially diﬀers from  the  original one:  First, in  terms  of  relative 
composition  of individual  characteristics;  second, by  observing  only  a  non-random  subpopulation 
in the  subsequent stages (e.g.,  only  those  who found indeed  a job).  For  observed  characteristics, 
these  composition  and  selection  eﬀects  are  controlled  by  the  inclusion  of  covariates. 
To  take  into  account  this  multiple  selectivity  on  the  level  of  unobserved  characteristics, 
we  follow  the  approach  of  Gritz  (1993)  and  Ham  and  LaLonde  (1996).  They  point  out  that 
addressing  the  selection  problem  consists  in  simultaneously  modeling  the  selection  processes 
into  the  treatment  and  later  into  (non-)employment  and  in  allowing  for  correlation  between 
the  diﬀerent  stages  of  the  individual’s  history.  The  ﬁrst  point  is  met  by  the  model  presented 
above.  The  second  is  handled  by  allowing  for  correlation  between  the  unobserved  heterogeneity 
components  of  the diﬀerent processes.  For  example,  an individual  who leaves  unemployment for 
employment  may  have  above  average  unobserved  characteristics.  This positive  composition  and 
selection  eﬀect (linked  to the fact  of having indeed found  a job)  may  mask the potentially  negative 
eﬀect  of  a sanction on subsequent  employment duration  – if we don’t  control for the correlation in 
unobservables between the  unemployment exit process and  the  subsequent  employment process. 
Such  arguments  may  be  made  for  all  our  proposed  models. 
Combining  such  a  design  and  our  precise  data,  the  eﬀect  of  interest  –  the  causal  eﬀect  of 
beneﬁt  sanctions  –  can  be  separated  from  the  discussed  selectivity  eﬀects  due  to  availability  of 
information  on  the  exact  timing  of  the  sanction  process  and  the  exit  process.  Causal  eﬀects  of 
28 In  Model  III  with  y1  earnings,  235  cases  (of  the  19,149  spells  in  the  e  group,  i.e.  1.23%)  are  censored  at 
10,000  CHF.  In  Model  III  with  y24, 255  cases (1.33%)  are  censored due to non-observability  and  additional 468 
cases (2.47%)  are  censored  at 200,000 CHF. In Model IV, 278  cases (of the 20,012  spells in the  y24 >  0  group,  i.e. 
1.32%)  are  censored due to  non-observability  and  additional 478  cases (2.27%)  are  censored  at 200,000 CHF. 
29 For  Model  III  with  y1  estimation  shows  that  none  of  the included log duration terms (up  to 6th power)  gets 
signiﬁcant,  whereas  for  the  Models  III  and  IV  with  y24  as  outcome  we  ﬁnd  that  all  the  included  log  duration 
terms  get  signiﬁcant  (at  the  1  or  2%  level).  This  interesting  observation  suggests  that  individuals  with  longer 
unemployment  duration  have  a  higher  propensity  to  fall  back  into  un- or  nonemployment  and  therefore  to  realize 
a  lower  y24,  compared  to  people  with  shorter  unemployment  spell. � 
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sanction  warnings  and  enforcements  on  unemployment exit and  the post-unemployment process 
create  a  conditional  dependence  between  the  ﬁve  or  six  processes:  i.e.,  the  outcome  measure 
changes  only  in  the  case  a  warning has been issued or  a  sanction has been  enforced.  On  the  other 
hand,  selectivity  creates  a  global  dependence  between  the  outcome  and  the  sanction  processes, 
captured  by  the  correlation  of  the  unobserved  heterogeneity  components. 
In  estimation  we  handle  unobserved  heterogeneity  in  the  standard  way  by  integrating  it  out 
over  the joint density function  G(v),  as  shown  in  equation  (4)  above.  The  vector  v  ∈  R6  or  + 
v  ∈  R+
5  comprises  all  the  unobserved  heterogeneity  components  of  the  respective  model:  In  the 
Model II,  v  = (vw,vs,ve,vne,vm,vnm),  in  the Models III and IV  we  replace  the last  two  elements 
by  vy1,  vy24 or  vy24t. 
We  model  G(v) to be a  multivariate discrete distribution of  unobserved heterogeneity.  Work 
by Heckman  and Singer (1984) suggests that discrete distributions  can  approximate  any  arbitrary 
distribution function.  We  assume that  each heterogeneity  component has two points  of  support 
(subscripts a  and  b).  Given the six sources of  unobserved heterogeneity  in Model II  and  the  ﬁve 
in the Models III  and IV, this implies that the joint distribution has in  maximum 64  or 32  mass 
points,  respectively.  The  associated  probabilities  are  of  the  form 
Pr(vw  =  vwg,vs  =  vsg,ve  =  veg,vne  =  vneg,vm  =  vmg,vnm  =  vnmg) =  pi  (9) 
Pr(vw  =  vwg,vs  =  vsg,ve  =  veg,vne  =  vneg,vr  =  vrg) =  pi  (10) 
whereby  expression (9)  applies to Model II  and  expression (10)  to the Models III  and IV. In the 
latter  case,  we  distinguish  r  =  {y1,y24,y24t}.  All  unobserved  heterogeneity  level  combinations 
with  g  =  {a,b}  for  each  process  are  possible.  This  generates  probabilities  pi  for  i  = 1,...,I  in 
Model  II  and  for  i  = 1,..., 32  in  the  Models  III  and  IV.  To  ensure  that  the  probabilities  pi  are 
between  zero  and  one,  and  sum  to  one,  we  model  pi  =  exp(ai)/  exp(ai)  and  normalize  the  i 
last  a  as  being  aI  = 0.  Note  that  we  specify  the  correlated  unobserved  heterogeneity  in  a  more 
ﬂexible  way  than in Ham  and LaLonde (1996),  who  rely  on  a  one-factor  structure,  and  most  of 
the  applications (e.g.  Van den Berg  and Vikstr¨ om 2009  or Bonnal  et  al.  1997). 
5  Estimation  Results 
We  report  in  the  following  the  results  of  the  parameter  estimates  of  the  Models  I  to  IV  as 
described  in  the  econometrics  section  4.  Then,  we  proceed  to  the  analysis  of  the  ex-ante  eﬀects. 
Thereafter,  we discuss how we  explain  our  ﬁndings from a theoretical point  of  view.  The section 
ends with  simulation  exercises based  on the  reported  estimation  results,  which  allow to quantify 
the  diﬀerent  treatment  eﬀects. 19  5 Estimation Results 
Tab. 1:	 The  eﬀect  of  beneﬁt  sanctions  on  exit  behavior  and  subsequent  non-/employment  dura­
tion 
Model  I  Model  II 
(Coeﬀ./Transf.)  Coeﬀ.  z-value  Transf.  Coeﬀ.  z-value  Transf. 
Eﬀect  on  exit  from  employment  (M) 
warning  (δwm/in  %)  0.018  0.34  0.019 
enforcement  (δsm/in  %)  0.140  2.35  0.150 
Eﬀect  on  exit  from  non-empl.  (NM) 
warning  (δwnm/in  %)  0.146  1.14  0.157 
enforcement  (δsnm/in  %)  0.267  1.97  0.307 
Eﬀect  on  exit  UE  →  E 
warning  (δwe/in  %)  0.158  3.48  0.171  0.147  3.39  0.159 
enforcement  (δse/in  %)  0.149  2.98  0.161  0.148  3.07  0.160 
Eﬀect  on  exit  UE  →  NE 
warning  (δwne/in  %)  0.637  4.69  0.890  0.689  5.05  0.992 
enforcement  (δsne/in  %)  0.515  4.10  0.674  0.513  4.05  0.670 
Unobserved  heterogeneity  Yes  Yes 
Control  variables  Yes  Yes 
Control  for  state  dependence  Yes  Yes 
PES  dummies  Yes  Yes 
-Log-Likelihood  198309  255064 
N  23961  23961 
Notes:  We  report  coeﬃcients  and  their  transformations:  Transformed  treatment  eﬀects  are  changes
 
in  %.  Asymptotic  z-values.
 
Source:  Own  estimations  based  on  merged  UIR-SSA  database.
 
5.1  Unemployment Exit Behavior and Subsequent (Non-)Employment Stability 
Table 1 provides information  on  the  econometric  estimates  of Models I and II.  Model  I  focuses  on 
the  eﬀects  of beneﬁt  sanctions  on  the  exit behavior  of  concerned individuals,  assuming  correlated 
unobserved  heterogeneity.  Results  of  the  point  estimates  of  the  treatment  eﬀects  indicate  that 
the log hazard  rate  of  exits into  employment (E)  goes  up  by  0.158  once individuals get  warned 
that  they  are  under  suspicion  of  having  committed  a  non-compliance.  Once  the  sanction  is 
enforced,  the  exit  to  E  rate  increases  by  additional  0.149.  Both  eﬀects  are  substantial  and 
highly  signiﬁcant.  Expressed  in  percentage  changes  (i.e.  exp(δ) −  1),  results  indicate  that  a 
sanction  warning  caused  a  17.1  %  increase  in  the  exit  to  E  rate,  whereas  actually  imposing  the 
sanction  adds  a  further  increase  of  the  rate  by  16.1  %. 
But  sanctions  and  warnings do  not  only foster  a quicker  take-up  of  a  regular job, they  also 
cause  an  increase  in  labor  force  exit.  An  announcement  of  a  sanction  leads  to  a  remarkable 
rise in the exit to non-employment (NE)  rate by 89.0 %.  Enforcing  the sanction results in an 
additional  increment  of  the  exit  to  NE  rate  by  67.4  %.  This  insight,  that  the  present  and  future 
disutility  of a sanction (warning)  inﬂuences the labor  supply decision,  is  new  in  the  literature, 
to  our  knowledge.  The  (highly  signiﬁcant)  eﬀect  is  non-trivial:  adding  up  the  warning  and 
enforcement  eﬀects  amounts  to  more  than  doubling  the  exit  to  NE  rate  (+116  %).  But  one 
has  to  put  this  result  in  the  right  context  of  interpretation:  First,  by  taking  into  account  that 20  5 Estimation Results 
”only”  12.5%  of  the  sample  exits  to  non-employment.  Second,  as  shown  below,  exit  to  NE  is 
often  temporary  and  can  partly  be  read  as  an  unpaid  prolongation  of  unemployment. 
Estimates diﬀer from the  earlier  studies by  Abbring  et  al.  (2005),  van den Berg (2004),  and 
Svarer (2007).  The two Dutch  studies  report increases in the  exit  rate due to  sanctions  on the 
order of 100 %.  Yet both Dutch  studies do not have  access to information on  sanction  warnings. 
As  Lalive  et  al.  (2005)  show,  this  may  lead  to  considerable  upward  bias  in  the  estimate  of  the 
enforcement  eﬀect  in  a  system  like  the  Swiss  where  job  seekers  are  informed  of  the  sanction 
process starting.  Svarer (2007)  ﬁnds for Denmark  an increase in the unemployment exit rate of 
yet  more than 50% following  enforcement.  Our results are near to Lalive  et  al.  (2005) who use a 
similar dataset.  They ﬁnd  that  warnings increase the hazard  rate by 25 %  and  a further increase 
by 20 % is  estimated  to  take place  after beneﬁts have been  reduced for Swiss job  seekers  entering 
unemployment in late 1997.  Some diﬀerences between the studies have to be taken into account: 
First,  Lalive  et  al.  (2005)  do  not  have  access  to  information  on  previous  earnings.  Arguably, 
previous  earnings  capture  labor  market  success  quite  tightly  leaving  little  room  for  unobserved 
heterogeneity.  Second,  the  current  study  is  using  information  on  beneﬁt  sanctions  covering  a 
broader  range  of  cantons  in  Switzerland  than  Lalive  et  al.  (2005).  To  the  extent  that  warnings 
and  enforcement  eﬀects  vary  across  Swiss  regions,  this  also  gives  rise  to  diﬀerences  in  estimates. 
Third,  the  distribution  of  unobserved  heterogeneity  is  more  comprehensively  estimated  in  this 
paper  than  in  Lalive  et  al.  (2005).  Finally,  endogenous  selection  of  the  exits  into  E  and  NE  is 
explicitly  taken into  account in this  study  by  modeling  the  exit to NE process, thereby  allowing 
for  correlated  unobserved  heterogeneity  in  this  destination  as  well. 
In  the  Appendix  B,  Table  7,  we  report  additionally  the  baseline  transition  rates  for  all 
processes  of  Model  I  and  Model  II  as  well  as  the  estimated  mass  point  probabilities.  Besides 
the estimated constant of the  ﬁrst piece of the baseline hazard (λ1),  we  indicate  the  transition 
rate of  an  ”average”  individual (see notes of Table 7 for details)  for the same ﬁrst split period. 
Our estimates  allow for two levels  of  unobserved heterogeneity  in  all four hazard  rates.  Starting 
from  a  restrictive  speciﬁcation  with  only  a  small  number  of  mass  points,  we  add  more  of  them 
as  long  as  they  increase  the  log  likelihood.  As  recommended  by  Gaure  et  al.  (2007),  we  select 
the  model  that  provides  the  best  ﬁt  according  to  the  log  likelihood. 
Finally,  we  take  a  look  on  the  role  of  the  unobserved  heterogeneity  in  Model  I.  Estimating  a 
version  of the  model  without  unobserved heterogeneity (not  reported)  reveals treatment  eﬀects 
of  δwe  =  −0.052/δse  = 0.082  for  the  exit  to  E  and  δwne  = 0.281/δsne  = 0.295  for  the  exit  to 
NE (signiﬁcant  on the 5%  and the 1% level,  respectively).  The clear diﬀerence to the  eﬀects 
reported  above  points  to  the  presence  of  unobserved  heterogeneity.  Moreover,  the  comparison 
of  the  models  with  and  without (correlated)  unobserved heterogeneity  reveals  a  certain  amount 
of  selectivity30 . 
30 This  can  be  explained  as  follows.  Estimates  indicate  that  there  are  12  diﬀerent  groups.  Is  there  selectivity 
with  respect to exit to E  and  warnings?  To see this,  consider the average baseline  exit  rate  of  the groups that have 
a high  warnings  rate (probabilities  p1 up  to  p8).  The  high  warnings  group  has  an  average  exit  rate  of  about  .15  % 
per day.  The low  warnings group (probabilities  p9,  p11,  p13 and  p16) has  an  average  exit  rate  of .18  %.  This  means 21  5 Estimation Results 
Now,  we  turn  to  Model  II  and  the  discussion  of  the  quality  of  post-unemployment  jobs: 
How  do  beneﬁt  sanctions  aﬀect  the  non-/employment  stability?  To  answer  this  question,  the 
duration of  the  ﬁrst  spell  of  employment (M) for the exit to E group  and  the duration of  the  ﬁrst 
spell  of  non-employment (NM)  for the  exit to NE group  is  analyzed.  Individuals  of  the E group 
who  face  a  sanction  warning  are  confronted  with  an  immediate  increase  of  the  exit  rate  from 
the  employment  spell  M  by  1.9%.  This  change  is  not  signiﬁcant.  In  contrast,  the  additional 
treatment  eﬀect  coming  from  imposing  the  sanction  is  highly  signiﬁcant  and  amounts  to  15.0% 
for  the  M  spells.  The  point  estimate  of  the  warning  eﬀect  for  the  NE  group  on  the  NM  spell  is 
markedly  higher,  15.7%,  but  not  signiﬁcant  either.  Again,  the  additional  enforcement  eﬀect  is 
signiﬁcant;  it  results  in  a  considerable  increase  of  the  NE  hazard  by  30.7%. 
Thus, Model II  reveals three important messages: First, and  most importantly, we  ﬁnd  clear 
evidence that sanctions  cause highly  relevant eﬀects on the individuals’  outcomes  after unemploy­
ment  exit.  Second,  estimates  show  that  the  sanction-driven  reduction  of  unemployment duration 
for  the  exit  to  E  group  is  paralleled  by  an  also  important  reduction  of  the  duration  of  the  ﬁrst 
employment  period  thereafter.  I.e.,  sanctions  reduce  subsequent  employment  stability.  Third, 
sanctions  foster  labor  force  exit  of  NE  individuals,  but  also  considerably  reduce  the  subsequent 
stay  in  non-employment.  Thus,  these  individuals  have  tendency  to  leave  paid  unemployment 
for  unregistered  unemployment  in  order  to  avoid  pressures  exerted  by  the  sanction  system  and 
to  ”gain”  more (unpaid)  time for job  search.  The substantial NM treatment eﬀect shows that 
this  situation  of  subsequent non-employment is  often  of  transitory  nature.  This is  supported by 
the  descriptive  evidence  that  –  whereas  the  median  M  spell  counts  25  months  –  the  median  NM 
spell  only  amounts  to  11  months. 
In the post-unemployment period,  unobserved heterogeneity plays  a  relevant  role in  shaping 
the treatment  eﬀects  on the duration of  the non-/employment spells.  The corresponding  version 
of  Model  II  without  unobserved  heterogeneity  (not  reported)  exerts  sanction  eﬀects  of  δwm  = 
0.053/δsm  = 0.035  for  the  E  group  and  of  δwnm  =  −0.094/δsnm  = 0.141  for  the  NE  group. 
Except for the  warning  eﬀect  on the M  spell (which falls from  weak to  no  signiﬁcance),  all the 
eﬀects go  up  once  unobserved heterogeneity is taken into  account.  A certain  amount  of  selectivity 
into the post-unemployment spells is present, too  – mainly  with  respect to the enforcement of  a 
sanction31 .  Finally,  we  may  note  that  in  Model  II  the  exit  to  E  and  to  NE  treatment  eﬀects  as 
well  as  the  four  transitions  in  the  unemployment  period  are  very  similar  to  the  corresponding 
estimates  of Model I. This is  a  comfortable  and  sensible  result  since  there is  no  obvious  argument 
that  there  is  relatively  small  negative  selection  into  warnings  of  individuals  with  lower  exit  rates.  This  explains 
why  the  warnings  eﬀect  increases  when  accounting  for  unobserved  heterogeneity.  In  the  same  manner,  the  group 
with high  enforcement  rates  shows  a bit lower  exit  rates (0.16 %)  than those  with  a low/zero  enforcement  rate 
(0.18  %).  This  shows  that  there  is  a  certain  negative  selection  into  enforcement  and  correspondingly  we  observe 
an  increase  in  the  treatment  eﬀect. 
31 Proceeding  as  in  footnote  30  we  ﬁnd,  when  analyzing  the  M  spells,  that  there  is  virtually  no  selectivity 
with  respect  to  warnings:  The  group  with  high  warnings  propensity  exerts  an  exit  rate  of  3.21%  per  month;  the 
low  warnings  rate  people  transit  out  of  M  by  3.20%  per  month.  In  contrast,  selectivity  between  enforcement 
and  M  exit  is  clearly  negative:  High  enforcement  rate  individuals  exit  from  M  with  2.89%  per  month  whereas 
no-enforcement  people  have  an  exit  rate  of  3.78%. 22  5 Estimation Results 
that  adding post-unemployment information  should  crucially  alter the estimation  results for the 
unemployment  processes. 
To  wrap  up  the  results  from  analyzing  the  sanction  eﬀects  on  exit  behavior  and  subsequent 
non-/employment  stability,  we  may  state  that,  besides  the  intended  eﬀect  of  reducing  the  time 
until  unemployed  take up  a regular job, we  ﬁnd  as well  eﬀects that  were presumably  not intended 
by  the  sanction  system  designers.  The  enforcement  of  a  sanction  causes  a  relevant  reduction  of 
subsequent  employment.  In  addition,  sanctions  may  as  well  foster  labor  force  exit  of  concerned 
individuals.  At  least,  there  is  a  group  among  these  for  whom  the  exit  to  non-employment  is 
only  transitory,  acting  as  a  non-paid  extension  of  the job  search duration. 
5.2  The  Eﬀects  on  Earnings  and  their  Persistence 
Tab. 2:	 The  eﬀect  of  beneﬁt  sanctions  on  earnings:  over  1  vs.  24  months  after  unemployment 
exit;  E (exit to  employment)  group 
Model  III:  earn  1  mt  Model  III:  earn  24  mt 
(Coeﬀ./Transf.)  Coeﬀ.  z-value  Transf.  Coeﬀ.  z-value  Transf. 
Eﬀect  on  earnings  over  1/24  mt 
warning  (δwy1/in  %)  0.077  2.40  0.080  δwy24/%  0.102  3.27  0.107 
enforcement  (δsy1/in  %)  0.050  1.18  0.051  δsy24/%  0.076  1.78  0.079 
Eﬀect  on  exit  UE  →  E 
warning  (δwe/in  %)  0.154  3.41  0.167  0.154  3.39  0.167 
enforcement  (δse/in  %)  0.152  3.02  0.165  0.147  2.93  0.159 
Eﬀect  on  exit  UE  →  NE 
warning  (δwne/in  %)  0.612  4.66  0.843  0.625  4.66  0.869 
enforcement  (δsne/in  %)  0.522  4.16  0.686  0.518  4.12  0.679 
Unobserved  heterogeneity  Yes  Yes 
Control  variables  Yes  Yes 
Control  for  state  dependence  Yes  Yes 
PES  dummies  Yes  Yes 
-Log-Likelihood  231704  289436 
N  23961  23961 
Notes:  We  report  coeﬃcients  and  their  transformations:  Transformed  treatment  eﬀects  are  changes
 
in  %.  Asymptotic  z-values.
 
Source:  Own  estimations  based  on  merged  UIR-SSA  database.
 
The impact  of  sanction  eﬀects  on the  sustainability  of post-unemployment jobs is one im­
portant  aspect  of  an  analysis  of  UI  sanction  systems  that  looks  beyond  unemployment  exit. 
But  in  order  to  gain  an  even  more  comprehensive  view  on  how  a  sanction  system  may  inﬂuence 
post-unemployment job quality, the analysis  of  earnings is  essential.  A glimpse  on the duration­
dependent  earnings  histories  of  Figure  3  in  the  descriptive  analysis  may  lead  to  the  hypothesis 
that  sanctions  reduce  subsequent  earnings.  But  as  mentioned  as  well,  this  analysis  could  be 
misleading  since  it  doesn’t  incorporate  the  issue  of  selectivity.  This  problem  is  addressed  in 
the  Models  III  which  feature  simultaneous  estimation  of  the  sanctioning  and  unemployment 
processes  together  with  the  earnings  process  of  the  exit  to  E  group,  allowing  for  correlated 23  5 Estimation Results 
unobserved  heterogeneity  in  all  the  5  processes. 
Table  2  reports  two  versions  of  Model  III:  First,  we  analyze  as  outcome  the  earnings  in  the 
ﬁrst (complete)  month  after  exit to  employment, i.e.  for the E group.  Second,  we build the 
sum of  realized  earnings over 24  months as outcome in the  ﬁfth process (for the same E group). 
The  comparison  of  the  two  sub-models  of  Model  III  allow  statements  on  the  persistence  of  the 
sanction eﬀects in the development of  the earnings  ﬂow.  Whereas the  ﬁrst  analysis gives insights 
on how the individual’s reaction on a sanction (warning)  is reﬂected in the take-up  of the  ﬁrst 
job after  unemployment,  the  second  analysis  aims  for  a  comprehensive  view  on  the  total  eﬀect 
of  sanctions  on  earnings generation in  mid-terms for the E group.  Thereby, the latter  allows for 
and  incorporates  the  eﬀects  of  switches  between  employment  and  non-employment  over  the  two 
years,  directly  or  indirectly  driven  by  previous  sanctions. 
How  do  sanctions  aﬀect  earnings  in  the  ﬁrst  month  after  leaving  unemployment?  Results 
from  Table  2  clearly  suggest  a  negative  eﬀect.  Already  the  act  of  warning  a job  seeker  that  a 
sanction procedure has been  started increases the  earnings hazard by  8.0 % for job  seekers  who 
leave  unemployment  after  having  been  warned  that  a  beneﬁt  reduction  may  take  place  in  the 
future.  The earnings hazard increases  somewhat  more,  albeit  statistically  insigniﬁcantly, for job 
seekers  who  experience  an  actual  beneﬁt  reduction.  Both  eﬀects  translate  into  lower  average 
earnings  for  sanctioned  job  seekers.  We  defer  a  discussion  of  the  magnitude  of  the  eﬀects  of 
beneﬁt  sanctions  on  average  earnings  to  section  5.5. 
Do  these  negative  earnings  eﬀects  persist  over  two  years?  Indeed,  they  do  –  they  even 
accentuate.  When  looking  at  the  treatment  eﬀect  of  a  sanction  warning  on  the  level  of  the 
sum  of  earnings  over  24  months,  we  clearly  observe  a  negative  eﬀect.  Warnings  increase  the  24 
month  earnings hazard by 10.7 %,  and  subsequent  actual beneﬁt  reduction increases  the  earnings 
hazard by  an additional 7.9%  – signiﬁcant at the 10% level.  Therefore, we can clearly  state that 
the  Models  III  provide  evidence  that  sanction  warnings  and  enforcements  exert  immediate  as 
well  as  persistent  negative  eﬀects  on  post-unemployment  earnings. 
Estimations  of  the  earnings  Models  III  are  aﬀected  much  less  by  the  inclusion  of  unobserved 
heterogeneity  than  Model  II.  Comparison  with  corresponding  models  without  unobserved  het­
erogeneity (not  reported)  reveals that  unobserved heterogeneity  only plays  a (rather  small)  role 
in  shaping  the  enforcement  eﬀect32 .  Selectivity  into  earnings  is  not  relevant33 .  The  small  role  of 
unobserved  heterogeneity  in  this  model  is  presumably  due  to  the  inclusion  of  extensive  controls 
for  state  dependence  into  the  model.  Controlling  for  earnings  and  employment  paths  in  the  last 
32 The  treatment  eﬀects  estimates  without  unobserved  heterogeneity  for  the  earnings  models  over  1  and  24 
months  are  the  following:  δwy1 = 0.086/δsy1  =  −0.036  and  δwy24 = 0.106/δsy24  = 0.033 
33 Analyzing  the  hazards  of  earnings  over  24  months,  we  ﬁnd  that  there  is  virtually  no  selectivity  with  respect 
to  warnings  which  is  of  non-relevant  size:  The  group  with  high  warnings  propensity  has  an  earnings  realization 
rate  of  0.348%  per  1000  CHF;  the  low  warnings  rate  people  leave  earnings  distribution  by  0.350%  per  1000  CHF. 
The  same  is  true  concerning  selectivity  with  respect  to  enforcement:  High  enforcement  rate  individuals  realize 
earnings  with  0.349%  per  1000  CHF  whereas  no-enforcement  people  have  exactly  the  same  rate  of  0.349%  per 
1000  CHF.  The  non-existence  of  a  selectivity  issue  here  is  supported  by  the  observation  that  only  0.6%  of  the 
sample  belongs  to  the  b  level  of  the  earnings  hazard.  Thus,  there  is  indeed  almost  no  unobserved  heterogeneity 
in  earnings. 24  5 Estimation Results 
ﬁve years before  unemployment  seems  to  capture pretty  well  the heterogeneity in future  earnings 
development  as  well.  This  is  consistent  with  the  long-term  stability  of  earnings  paths  that  we 
observed  in  the  descriptive  Figure  3. 
Summing  up,  we  can  clearly  state  that  sanctions  not  only  negatively  aﬀect  stability  and 
duration  of  employment  (of  the  E  group),  but  as  well  the  level  of  earnings  that  is  generated 
from  this  employment  after  unemployment  exit.  This  suggests  that  sanctions  not  only  aﬀect  the 
search behavior by  favoring  more temporary jobs, but that  they  cause  the  concerned  individuals 
as  well  to  reduce  their demands  towards future jobs in  terms  of  earnings. 
5.3  The  Eﬀects  on  Earnings:  Temporary  vs  Permanent  Labor  Force  Exits 
Tab. 3:	 The  eﬀect of beneﬁt  sanctions  on  earnings  over 24  months:  E group (excluding temporary 
and permanent labor force  exits)  vs.  total population  with positive  earnings (excluding 
only  permanent  labor  force  exits) 
Model  III:  earn  24  mt  Model  IV:  earn  24  mt 
(Coeﬀ./Transf.)  Coeﬀ.  z-value  Transf.  Coeﬀ.  z-value  Transf. 
Eﬀect  on  earnings  over  24  mt 
warning  (δwy24/in  %)  0.102  3.27  0.107  δwy24t/%  0.117  4.02  0.124 
enforcement  (δsy24/in  %)  0.076  1.78  0.079  δsy24t/%  0.104  2.66  0.109 
Eﬀect  on  exit  UE  →  E/Y 
warning  (δwe/in  %)  0.154  3.39  0.167  δwy/%  0.181  4.33  0.198 
enforcement  (δse/in  %)  0.147  2.93  0.159  δsy/%  0.211  4.55  0.235 
Eﬀect  on  exit  UE  →  NE/0 
warning  (δwne/in  %)  0.625  4.66  0.869  δw0 /%  0.830  2.59  1.294 
enforcement  (δsne/in  %)  0.518  4.12  0.679  δs0/%  0.294  1.73  0.342 
Unobserved  heterogeneity  Yes  Yes 
Control  variables  Yes  Yes 
Control  for  state  dependence  Yes  Yes 
PES  dummies  Yes  Yes 
-Log-Likelihood  231704  294752 
N  23961  23961 
Notes:  We  report  coeﬃcients  and  their  transformations:  Transformed  treatment  eﬀects  are  changes
 
in  %.  Asymptotic  z-values.
 
Source:  Own  estimations  based  on  merged  UIR-SSA  database.
 
In  a  ﬁnal  step,  we  analyze  Model  IV  –  by  comparing  it  to  Model  III  –  which  features  as 
well  earnings  over  24  months  as  outcome.  But  whereas  Model  III  only  focuses  on  earnings  for 
job  seekers  who  start  earning  immediately  after  leaving  unemployment,  Model  IV  adds  those 
job  seekers  who  temporarily  leave  the  labor  force.  Thus,  the  key  diﬀerence  between  the  two 
models lies in the feature that individuals exiting  ﬁrst to non-employment and  taking  up  a job 
later  on  are  part  of  the  analyzed  earnings  group  in  Model  IV,  whereas  they  are  not  in  Model 
III.  Table  3  reports  the  treatment  eﬀects  on  this  total  population  with  positive  earnings  and 
opposes  them  to  the  results  of Model III  with  earnings  over  24  months,  which is  reproduced here 
for  convenience.  The  eﬀects  of  announcing  to  an  individual  the  start  of  a  sanction  investigation 25  5 Estimation Results 
and  of  eﬀectively  imposing  a  temporary  beneﬁt  reduction  both  are  stronger  in  Model  IV  than 
in  the  corresponding  Model  III.  A  warning  increases  the  earnings  hazard  by  12.4%  whereas 
imposing  the  sanction  leads  in  addition  to  an  increase  in  the  earnings  hazard  by  10.9%.  What 
does  the  fact  that  warnings  and  sanctions  exert  a  higher  reductive  eﬀect  on  earnings  in  Model 
IV  mean?  This  suggests  that  individuals  coming  back  from  a  transitory  non-employment  period 
after  unemployment  are  faced  with  a  stronger  sanction  eﬀect  in  total  over  24  months.  Thus,  the 
additional  non-paid time for job  search doesn’t  allow  them  to get  a job that is  so  much better  that 
it  would  compensate  the  incurred  additional  earnings  loss  during  the  non-employment  period. 
Exiting  labor  force  to  avoid  sanction  pressure  is  truly  costly. 
Note  that  the  estimation  of  Model  IV  implies  diﬀerent  competing  risks  destinations  with 
respect  to  unemployment  exit  than  the  Models  I  to  III  did34 .  Here,  we  distinguish  the  exits  to 
positive  earnings  over  the  24  subsequent  months  versus  the  exit  to  permanent  labor  force  exit 
over  24  months.  Accordingly,  the  exit  treatment  eﬀects  and  the  four  respective  transition  rates 
estimates  may  be  diﬀerent  from  the  ones  of  the  previous  models.  Indeed,  they  are  –  albeit  not 
to  large  amount.  The  warning  and  enforcement  eﬀects  on  the  two  exit  destinations  are  stronger 
(in  the  case  of  the  permanent  labor  force  exit  group  only  when  looking  at  the  total  eﬀect). 
The  higher  increases  in  the  respective  hazard  rates  are  sensible:  The  temporary  labor  force  exit 
individuals  who  are  now in  the Y group  contribute  with  their  tendency  to  exit labor force (which 
is quantitatively  higher as the exit to E  eﬀect,  as  we know from the previous models)  to the  now 
higher  treatment  eﬀects. 
The individuals in the permanent exit from labor force (0)  group  – a small group  of 1122 
people  or  4.7%  of  the  sample  –  seem  to  show  an  increased  propensity  to  immediately  leave 
registered  unemployment  once  a  sanction  investigation  is  announced.  Their  expected  value  of 
ﬁnding  a job in the future must have been very  near to the  value  of leaving the formal labor 
market  already  before  a  sanction  event  occurred.  Thus,  once  the  disutility  of  being  warned 
(with  an  increased  expectation  of  being  enforced  in  the  future)  materializes,  the  decision  of 
these  individuals  tends  to  change  towards  an  increased  willingness  to  leave  formal  labor  market. 
5.4  Ex-ante  Eﬀects 
Previous theory and  evidence in the  small UI  sanctions literature pointed to the importance  of  ex-
ante  eﬀects  of beneﬁt sanctions (see section 1).  The mere  ”threat”  of  the presence of  a sanction 
system  may  induce  job  seekers  to  behave  more  according  to  the  search,  job  acceptance  and 
34 But  with  respect  to  the  presence  of  unobserved  heterogeneity  and  of  selectivity,  the  conclusion  is  broadly 
the  same  as  for  the  Models  III:  Unobserved  heterogeneity  is  virtually  non-relevant.  Only  the  enforcement  eﬀect 
increases  a  bit  when  taking  it  into  account.  The  treatment  eﬀects  for  a  model  without  unobserved  heterogeneity 
(table  again  not  reported)  are  δwy24t  = 0.119/δsy24  = 0.065.  Selectivity  into  earnings  is  non-existent:  High 
warnings  rate  people  have  an  earnings  realization  rate  of  0.413%  per  1000  CHF  whereas  it  amounts  for  those 
with  low  warnings  rates  to  0.416%.  Individuals  with  high  enforcement  propensity  exert  an  earnings  realization  of 
0.414%  per  1000  CHF,  never-enforced  individuals  one  of  0.412%.  Again,  the  b  level  of  unobserved  heterogeneity 
in  the  earnings process  covers  as less  as 1%  of  the  sample, indicating  virtually  no heterogeneity (once  controlled 
for  state  dependence). 26  5 Estimation Results 
Tab. 4: Ex-ante  eﬀects:  Regression  of PES-speciﬁc outcomes  on  monitoring/warning policy  and 
unemployment  rates  by  PES 
Model  I  Model  II  Models  III  Model  IV 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
exit  to  E  exit  to  NE  empl  non-empl  earn  1  mt  earn  24  mt  earn  24  mt 
αe  αne  αm  αnm  αe1  αe24  αe24y 
αw  0.107*  0.030  0.137  0.148  0.031**  0.056*  0.054** 
(0.061)  (0.042)  (0.084)  (0.101)  (0.014)  (0.028)  (0.025) 
UER  -0.254***  -0.004  0.021  -0.726***  -0.001  -0.021  -0.022 
(0.092)  (0.102)  (0.082)  (0.178)  (0.033)  (0.043)  (0.040) 
Const  -2.246***  -1.882***  -0.022  -3.237***  -0.147  -0.186  -0.223 
(0.317)  (0.335)  (0.281)  (0.586)  (0.115)  (0.147)  (0.135) 
N  52  52  52  52  52  52  52 
R2  0.323  0.009  0.228  0.403  0.096  0.155  0.163 
Notes:  OLS  regressions,  weighted by  the population  of  the PES (registered  unemployed during inﬂow
 
period).  Robust  standard  errors  in  parentheses.  ***  p<0.01,  **  p<0.05,  *  p<0.1.  αw  is  averaged  over
 
the  ﬁve  estimated  models  in  order  to  reduce  measurement  error.  The  alphas  and  the  unemployment
 
rates  are  in  logs.
 
Source:  Own  estimations  based  on  merged  UIR-SSA  database. 
ALMP  participation  obligations  imposed  by  unemployment  insurance.  The  estimated  Models 
I  to  IV  allow  us  to  investigate  this  kind  of  policy  eﬀect  for  the  Swiss  sanction  system.  In  all 
the  models,  we  estimated  PES  ﬁxed  eﬀects  for  all  the  respective  processes.  The  PES  eﬀects 
in  the  warning  process,  αw,  represent,  presumably,  a  measure  of  how  strictly  a  certain  PES 
oﬃce  monitors  and  consequently  warns.  Being  the  result  of  the  very  federalist  way  of  policy 
implementation  in  Switzerland,  these  PES  ﬁxed  eﬀects  –  and  PES-speciﬁc  warning  rates  in 
general (as descriptive analyses show)  – vary  considerably.  We exploit this variation to estimate 
the  eﬀect  of  monitoring  strictness  on  the  PES-speciﬁc  level  of  the  diﬀerent  outcomes.  Since 
the  regional  labor  market  conditions  could  inﬂuence  PES-speciﬁc  sanction  policy,  we  control  in 
addition for the  regional  unemployment  rates by  PES (averaged  over 1998  and 1999).35 
Table 4, featuring  the  respective (population-weighted)  OLS  regressions,  shows that  ex-ante 
eﬀects  are  in  most  of  our  estimated  models  a  relevant  issue.  In  the  case  of  exit  to  employment, 
we  ﬁnd  a signiﬁcant  ex-ante eﬀect: When increasing  monitoring intensity (measured  as the PES­
speciﬁc log  warnings rate)  by  one standard deviation (0.887), the PES-speciﬁc log  exit to E  rate 
increases  by  0.095  or  a  quarter  of  a  standard  deviation.  Moreover,  for  the  ex-ante  eﬀect  we  ﬁnd 
a  tradeoﬀ  that  is  very  similar  to  the  ex  post  eﬀect.  While  higher  warnings  rates  increase  the 
probability  of  leaving  unemployment  for  employment,  they  tend  to  reduce  post  unemployment 
35 Note  that  accounting  for  regional  unemployment  rate  is  important  for  transitions  from  paid  and  unregistered 
unemployment  to  employment  suggesting  that  this  rate  captures  key  diﬀerences  in  labor  demand  across  Swiss 
PES. 27  5 Estimation Results 
earnings.  A  one standard deviation increase in warnings, increases the earnings hazard by 2.7 % 
in the  ﬁrst month  after leaving  unemployment suggesting  that non-sanctioned job  seekers leave 
unemployment for jobs that  are paid  worse or that  oﬀer shorter hours.  Moreover,  a one standard 
deviation  increase  in  warnings  increases  the  earnings  hazard  in  the  ﬁrst  two  years  after  leaving 
unemployment  by  4.9  %  –  even  though  sanction  warnings  do  not  appear  to  reduce  employment 
stability  to  a  signiﬁcant  extent.36  This  suggests  that job  seekers  are locked into jobs  of  worse 
quality.  Interestingly,  the  sanction  policy  is  not  relevant  for  those  leaving  unemployment  for 
non-employment  suggesting  that  those  who  have  tendency  to  extend  unemployment  duration 
by  leaving  for  temporary  non-employment  do  not  yet  react  on  the  mere  ”threat”  of  a  stricter 
sanction  policy. 
5.5  Quantifying  the  eﬀects  of  beneﬁt  sanctions 
The  key  result  of  the  empirical  analysis  is  that  sanction  warning  and  enforcement  speed  up  exit 
from  registered  unemployment  thereby  increasing  post  unemployment  earnings  due  to  earlier 
start  on the job.  However,  sanction  warnings  and enforcements  also  reduce the level  of post­
unemployment  earnings.  How  do  these  two  eﬀects  on  post  unemployment  earnings  add  up?37 
We  provide  two  sets  of  simulations  on  the  eﬀects  of  sanctions  on  earnings  in  a  two  year  period 
after  leaving  unemployment.  Note  that  we  focus  on  post  unemployment  earnings  rather  than 
post  unemployment  income. 
The  ﬁrst  set  of  simulations  provides  information  on  the  ex  post  eﬀects  of  beneﬁt  sanctions. 
The  simulation  compares  the  actual  pattern  of  leaving  unemployment  and  post  unemployment 
earnings  with  counterfactual  unemployment  exit  and  post  unemployment  trajectories.  Actual 
and  counterfactual  trajectories  only  diﬀer  with  respect  to  the  post  warning  unemployment  ex­
perience.  Whereas  the  actual  trajectory  imposes  our  estimates  of  the  warning  and  enforcement 
treatment  eﬀects from Model IV, the counterfactual  scenario  sets these treatment  eﬀects to  zero 
(see  appendix  section  B for further details).38  Note  that  all  simulations  fully  take  the  competing 
risks  nature (exits to paid post unemployment  vs  exits to  unpaid post  unemployment)  of the 
exit  destination  into  account. 
Table  5,  panel  A  provides  the  results.  Actual  time  in  unemployment  until  an  exit  with  at 
least  some earnings in the two year period  after leaving  unemployment lasts for 244 days.  Coun­
terfactual  time  to  leaving  unemployment  is  277  days.  Thus,  sanction  warning  and  enforcement 
36 Note,  however,  that  the  eﬀect  of  warnings  on  the  rate  of  leaving  employment  is  quantitatively  importance 
and  it  is  very  near  to  signiﬁcant  at  the  10  %  level.  Using  a  model  that  population-weights  inside  each  canton  ­
i.e.  stressing  the  inter-cantonal  variation  –  this  eﬀect  becomes  signiﬁcant  too. 
37 Note  that  we  discuss  eﬀects  on  earnings  rather  than  on  income  to  isolate  the  mechanical  eﬀects  of  sanctions 
(i.e.  unemployment  beneﬁt  reduction)  on  income  from  the  behavioral  eﬀects  of  sanctions  on  income.  Moreover, 
we  completely  abstract  from  discounting  of  future  pay  reductions  which  tends  to  bias  our  results  in  the  negative 
direction.  Finally,  we  do  not  address  general  equilibrium  eﬀects  of  sanctions,  as  discussed  in  Boone  et  al.  (2007). 
38 Note  that  we  take  both  the  warnings  eﬀect  and  the  enforcement  eﬀect  into  account  because  warning  without 
enforcing  is  not  a  policy  option.  We  simulate  an  enforcement  date  for  those  job  seekers  who  leave  unemploy­
ment  before  the  enforcement  date  by  assuming  their  beneﬁts  are  reduced  at  the  median  time  from  warning  to 
enforcement. 28  5 Estimation Results 
Tab. 5: Simulations:  Eﬀects  of  sanctions  on  expected  earnings  and  unemployment  durations 
Expected  earnings/ 
duration (CHF/days) 
A:  Ex-post  eﬀects  (on  the  sanctioned) 
...  on  post-unemployment  earnings  (Y  group) 
with  sanction 
without  sanction 
ATETY 24:  E(Y 24
1 − Y 24





...  on  duration  until  leaving  unemployment  for  Y 
with  sanction 
without  sanction 
ATETTy :  E(T
1 − T





Trade-oﬀ:  in  days  of  lost  earnings  (with  sanction) 
E(ATETY 24,i) 




...  on  duration  until  leaving  unemployment  for  0 
with  sanction 
without  sanction 
ATETT0 :  E(T
1 − T





B:  Ex-ante  eﬀects  (on  everyone,  non-sanctioned) 
...  on  post-unemployment  earnings  (Y  group) 
under  intensiﬁed  warning  policy 
under  actual  warning  policy 
ATETY 24:  E(Y 24
1 − Y 24





...  on  duration  until  leaving  unemployment  for  Y 
under  intensiﬁed  warning  policy 
under  actual  warning  policy 
ATETTy :  E(T
1 − T





Trade-oﬀ:  in  days  of  lost  earnings  (under  intensiﬁed  warning  policy) 
E(ATETY 24,i) 




...  on  duration  until  leaving  unemployment  for  0 
under  intensiﬁed  warning  policy 
under  actual  warning  policy 
ATETT0 :  E(T
1 − T





Notes:  Simulation  is  based  on  actual  sanction  histories;  see  Appendix  B  for  details.  Treated 
group  =  at  least  one  warning.  Tradeoﬀ:  Mean  of  individual  tradeoﬀs  which  represent  the  dif­
ference  between  ATETTy ,i  and  ATETY 24,i  in  days  of  lost  earnings  with  sanction;  note  that  the 
earnings  loss,  ATETY 24,i,  is  reduced  by  ATETTy ,i  days  since  the  comparison  period  for  the  non­
sanctioned/actual  warning  regime is  ATETTy ,i  days longer  than for  the  sanctioned/intensiﬁed warning 
regime.  Y /0=positive/zero  earnings  over  24 months  after  unemployment. 
Source:  Own  calculations  from  merged  UIR-SSR  database. 
reduce job  search duration by  33 days  or  a bit  more than 1  month.  Clearly,  reduced  unemploy­
ment  duration  implies  earlier  exit  to  paid  post  unemployment.  But  is  one  month  of  earlier  exit
 29  5 Estimation Results 
enough  to  undo  the  reductions  in  post  unemployment  earnings?  Earnings  simulations  indicate 
that  individuals  who  are  sanctioned  have,  on  average,  post  unemployment  earnings  of  71,944 
CHF  in  the  two  years  after  unemployment.  In  contrast,  had  they  not  been  sanctioned,  they 
would  have  earned  78,113  CHF  in  a  period  of  two  years.  This  means  that  post  unemployment 
earnings  have  been  reduced  by  6,170  CHF  or  by  8.6  %  compared  to  earnings  with  a  sanction 
or  about  63  days  of  pay  with  a  sanction.  On  net,  this  means  that  while  sanctioned  individuals 
gain  about  one  month  of  pay,  they  lose  the  equivalent  of  two  months  of  earnings  with  sanction. 
How  about  individuals  who  leave  unemployment  to  non-employment?  Actual  time  to  leaving 
unemployment  is  309  days,  whereas  the  counterfactual  duration  is  343  days,  or  34  days  shorter 
(reduction  of  10  %).39  Yet  since  the  labor  earnings  of  individuals  who  leave  to  non-employment 
are  zero,  earlier  exit to  unpaid post  unemployment does not aﬀect post unemployment earnings. 
The  second  set  of  simulations  provides  information  on  the  ex  ante  eﬀect.  Here,  we  ﬁrst 
simulate  actual time to paid  and  unpaid post  unemployment,  as  well  as  subsequent  earnings in 
the  former  case,  for  all  job seekers  using  actual  estimates  of  the  PES  dummies  in  the  respective 
exit  and  earnings processes.  We  then  ask, how  much  earlier job  seekers  would leave  unemploy­
ment  if  PES  were  asked  to  increase  their  warning  intensity  to  a  minimum  standard,  and  what 
eﬀect  that  would  have  on  the  earnings  thereafter.  We  set  this  minimum  standard  equal  to  the 
mean  estimated  warnings  intensity  plus  one  standard  deviation  of  the  estimated  PES  dummies. 
This  means  that  PES  with  estimated  warnings  intensities  below  that  level  are  required  to  in­
crease  warnings  intensity  while  PES  which  already  fulﬁl  that  minimum  standard  will  face  no 
adjustment.  How does this  aﬀect the hazards  of leaving  unemployment  and generating  earnings 
thereafter?  We  use  estimates  of  the  ex  ante  eﬀects  in  Table  4  to  assess  how  changes  in  warning 
rates  translate  into  changes  in  exit  rates  and  earnings  hazards. 
Results indicate  that job  search  until leaving for paid post  unemployment lasts for  about 203 
days (Table 5 panel B). With increased  warnings intensity, job  search  would last for 193 days. 
Thus,  job  search  is  reduced  by  about  10  days  due  to  the  ex  ante  eﬀect.  In  contrast,  leaving 
unemployment  earlier due  to  more  strict  warning  also leads  to  earnings  reductions.  Whereas job 
seekers  earn  84,684  CHF  in  the  two  years  after  leaving  unemployment  in  the  actual  situation, 
their incomes  would be  reduced  to 83,201 CHF  or 1,483 CHF (1.8 %  of  actual  earnings)  in the 
counterfactual  situation  with  more intense  warning.  This means that, in the intensiﬁed  warning 
regime,  leaving  unemployment  earlier  by  10  days  is  associated  with  an  earnings  loss  that  is 
equivalent 13 days of full pay.  Interestingly, in contrast to  our  ﬁnding for the ex post  eﬀects, the 
ex  ante  eﬀects  on  leaving  unemployment  and  post  unemployment  earnings  roughly  balance  for 
those  individuals  who  leave  unemployment  for  paid  post  unemployment  situation.  But  one  has 
39 Interestingly,  whereas  the  treatment  eﬀects  on  the  hazard  of  leaving  unemployment  for  unpaid  post  unem­
ployment  are  much  larger  than  the  treatment  eﬀects  of  leaving  unemployment  for  paid  post  unemployment,  the 
treatment  eﬀects  on  expected duration  are  very  similar.  This is due  to  the fact  that  the (log)  hazard  of leaving 
unemployment  for  unpaid  post  unemployment  is  much  lower  than  the  hazard  of  leaving  unemployment  for  paid 
post  unemployment.  Thus,  while  the  relative  eﬀect  on  the  hazard  is  indeed  much  larger  for  exits  to  unpaid  post 
unemployment,  the  changes  in  the  hazard  rates  and  durations  are  much  more  similar. 30  5 Estimation Results 
Tab. 6: Simulations:  Proportions  by  unemployment  exit  destinations 
A: Ex-post  eﬀects (on the  sanctioned) 
Exit  to  Y  Exit  to  0 
With  sanction  0.8582  0.1315 
Without  sanction  0.8369  0.0731 
B:  Ex-ante  eﬀects  (on  everyone,  non-sanctioned) 
Exit  to  Y  Exit  to  0 
Under  intensiﬁed  warning  policy  0.8964  0.0612
 
Under  actual  warning  policy  0.8758  0.0720
 
Notes:  Simulation  is  based  on  actual  sanction  histories.  Calculation  of 
proportions  is  based  on  integrated  conditional  densities;  for  details,  see 
Appendix  B.  Treated  group  =  at  least  one  warning.  Y/0=positive/zero 
earnings  over  24  months  after  unemployment. 
Source:  Own  calculations  from  merged  UIR-SSR  database. 
to  take  into  account  that  this  rather  small  net  ex  ante  eﬀect  of  4  days  of  loss  concerns  everyone 
of  the  leavers  to  paid  post  unemployment,  i.e.  89.3%  of  the  Y  group (see  Table  6,  panel  A). 
How  about  leaving  unemployment  for  non-employment?  Average  duration  until  exiting  for 
unpaid  post  unemployment  is  about  280.6  days.  With  increased  warnings  intensity  two  things 
happen.  On  one  hand,  the  propensity  of  leaving  unemployment  for  paid  post  unemployment 
increases,  whereas  the  rate  of  leaving  unemployment  for  unpaid  post  unemployment  decreases. 
The  net  eﬀect  of  these  two  countervailing  eﬀects  turns  out  to  be  negative,  i.e.  with  increased 
warnings intensity  time to exit from unemployment decreases by 10.9 days to 269.7 days.  Again, 
the  earnings  situation  of individuals leaving for  unpaid post  unemployment does  not  change  since 
there  are  no  post  unemployment  earnings. 
Based  on  the  simulations,  we  can  calculate  the  proportions  of  individuals  leaving  for  the 
two  possible  exit  destinations  (Y  and  0).  These  proportions,  shown  in  Table  6,  support  the 
observation from above  about countervailing  eﬀects in the 0 group.  Under actual  warning, 7.2% 
of the job  seekers  exit to  unpaid post unemployment (panel B),  whereas under the intensiﬁed 
warning policy  only 6.1%  exit  to 0.  The  opposite is  the  case for  exiting  to  Y .  This highlights  the 
mechanism  of  reaction  on  the  policy  change  in  the  0  group:  Due  to  intensiﬁed  warnings,  some 
job seekers  now  rather  exit  to  paid  post  unemployment  instead  of  entering  the  unpaid  as  they 
would  in  the  status  quo.  Thus,  an  intensiﬁed  warning  policy  brings  some  individuals  back  to 
reentering  labor  market.  This is,  over the  whole,  not the  case for the  ex post  eﬀects (panel A): 
Being  sanctioned  leads  to  some  more  entries  into  Y ,  but  the  proportion  of  exits  to  0  increases 
40  even  more . 
40 Thus,  what  appears  less  often  in  the  sanctioned  case,  are  the  long,  censored  durations. 31  5 Estimation Results 
5.6  What  explains  our  ﬁndings? 
Job  search  theory  provides  a  convenient  framework  for  understanding  our  results  on  the  eﬀects 
of  beneﬁt  sanctions.41  There  are  two  behavioral  responses  of  unemployed  workers  to  beneﬁt 
sanctions.  First,  they  might  increase  search  intensity.  Second,  sanctions  could  make them lower 
their demands concerning post-unemployment jobs, i.e.  reduce their  reservation  wage.  Beneﬁt 
sanctions  aﬀect  behavior  because  they  reduce  the  value  of  being  unemployed.  Two  eﬀects 
may  be  distinguished.  The  ﬁrst  eﬀect  is  the  ex-post  eﬀect,  the  eﬀect  that  a  beneﬁt  reduction 
increases  costs  of being unemployed  thereby  changing  the behavior  of  the  unemployed.  However, 
unemployed  may  already  change  their  behavior  in  anticipation  of  a  beneﬁt  sanction,  to  avoid 
getting  one  imposed.  This  second  eﬀect  is  the  ex-ante  eﬀect,  the  eﬀect  that  the  risk  of  getting 
a  beneﬁt  sanction  inﬂuences  behavior  as  well. 
Both  increased  search  intensity  and  lower  reservation  wages  lead  to  a  reduction  of  unem­
ployment duration.  But how  will beneﬁt  sanctions  aﬀect post  unemployment  earnings  and job 
stability?  From  a  theoretical  point  of  view,  increased  search  intensity  could  lead  to  a  post­
unemployment job that is  at least  as good  as the job that  would have been found  without  a 
sanction.  However,  to  the  extent  that  a  reduction  of  the  reservation  wage  leads  to  acceptance 
of  lower  quality  jobs,  wage  loss  and  reduced  job  duration  may  be  expected.  Thus,  theoreti­
cal  predictions  are  inconclusive  concerning  post-unemployment  sanction  eﬀects.  It  is  up  to  an 
empirical  evaluation  to  establish  which  eﬀects  dominate  in  practice. 
Moreover,  the  eﬀects  of  warnings  and  of  enforcing  the  beneﬁt  sanction  may  diﬀer  if  job 
seekers  search for jobs  of diﬀerent quality.  Job  seekers  who  receive  a  warning letter know  that 
the probability  of  a beneﬁt  reduction has  substantially increased but  they  continue  to  receive  the 
same beneﬁts.  In contrast, job  seekers  who receive the information that their beneﬁts are cut 
experience  a  strong,  temporary  reduction  in  the  stream  of  beneﬁts  received.  Diﬀerences  in  the 
eﬀects  of  a  warning  and  the  eﬀects  of  an  actual  beneﬁt  reduction  may  be  related  to  the  quality 
of jobs workers are looking for.  Suppose there are two types of jobs;  “good”  jobs referring  to 
full-time permanent positions and  “bad” jobs referring  to part-time and/or temporary positions. 
Job  seekers  entering  unemployment  will be  searching  for good jobs  while disregarding  bad jobs. 
Receiving  the  warning  letter  decreases  the  value  of  remaining  unemployed.  This  will  increase 
intensity  of  searching  for good jobs  while leaving  unaﬀected intensity  of  searching  for bad jobs. 
Seeing the beneﬁts  actually reduced decreases the  value  of  staying  unemployed  more  substantially 
leading  job  seekers  to  search  for  bad  jobs  as  well  as  for  good  jobs.  So,  warnings  may  have 
diﬀerent  eﬀects from  actual beneﬁt  reductions  with  respect to the quality  of jobs  accepted.  The 
fact  that  warnings  do,  ex  post,  not  reduce  employment  stability  but  enforcements  do,  could 
41 See Boone  and Van Ours (2006)  and Boone  et  al.  (2007) for  recent  analyses  of this issue in the labor  market 
context.  It  is  shown  that  from  a  welfare  point  of  view  it  may  be  optimal  to  introduce  monitoring  and  sanctions 
into  the  system  of  unemployment  insurance.  In  Becker’s  (1968)  theory  with  risk  neutral  agents  the  social  loss 
from  oﬀenses  would  be  minimized  by  setting  ﬁnes  high  enough  to  eliminate  all  oﬀenses.  If  unemployed  workers 
are  risk  averse  this  result  may  not  hold  for  the  labor  market  and  a  combination  of  intensive  monitoring  and  small 
ﬁnes  may  be  the  optimal  outcome. 32  6 Conclusions 
theoretically  be  explained  distinguishing  between  search  for  a  temporary  vs  a  permanent  job. 
The key  idea is that job  seekers  may  not  search for temporary jobs  until  they  experience  actual 
beneﬁt  reductions42 .  This  would  explain  why  sanction  warnings  have  no  eﬀect  on  employment 
stability  whereas beneﬁt  reductions  clearly  shorten post  employment  spells.  In Appendix A,  we 
outline  this  theoretical  explanation  more  in  detail. 
Our  ﬁndings for the  ex post eﬀects  of beneﬁt  sanctions  suggest that,  consistent  with job  search 
theory, beneﬁt  warnings and  reductions increase the rate of leaving  unemployment.  Yet, there is 
also  a signiﬁcant  reduction in post  unemployment  earnings possibly because of lower  reservation 
wages.  On  net,  the  positive  eﬀects  of  leaving  unemployment  more  quickly  do  not  outweigh  the 
negative eﬀects of beneﬁt sanctions.  In terms of ex ante eﬀects, we  ﬁnd that job seekers who 
are  confronted  with  higher  warning  probabilities  leave  unemployment  more  quickly.  Yet  again, 
faster  exit  from  unemployment  is  accompanied  by  lower  earnings  leading  to  a  net  reduction  in 
post  unemployment  earnings.  Regarding  warning  and  enforcement  eﬀects,  we  ﬁnd  that  while 
mere  warnings  increase  the  rate  of  leaving  unemployment,  they  do  not  aﬀect  employment  and 
non-employment  durations.  In  contrast,  actual  beneﬁt  reductions  do  not  only  lead  to  a  faster 
exit  from  unemployment  but  they  also  tend  to  reduce  the  duration  of  employment. 
The  clear  persistence  of  negative  sanction eﬀects on earnings up  to two years after unemploy­
ment  exit  may be  explained by  lock-in into the  accepted job  or by  faster  return to  unemployment. 
Once  the  individual  has  accepted  a  lower-quality-job,  it  may  be  diﬃcult  for  him/her  to  catch 
up  with  the  non-sanctioned people by quickly  changing  to  a better job.  Moreover, individuals 
who accept  a worse paid job  are more likely  to leave this job  and  return to unemployment.  Both 
lines  of  reasoning  explain  why  sanctions  lead  to  a  reduction  in  post  unemployment  earnings. 
6  Conclusions 
Activating  unemployed  workers  through  the  introduction  of  a  system  of  beneﬁt  sanctions  may 
be  relatively  cheap  and  eﬀective in bringing  unemployed back  to  work  more quickly.  However,  a 
comprehensive policy  evaluation  of  a system  of beneﬁt sanctions  should  not only  consider direct 
eﬀects in  terms  of  reduced  unemployment durations  and  reductions in beneﬁt payments, but  also 
consider  indirect  eﬀects  in  terms  of  employment  stability,  earnings  and  attachment  to  the  labor 
market.  This  is  what  we  do  in  our  study  using  a  rich  set  of  Swiss  register  data.  We  present  one 
of  the  ﬁrst  empirical  studies  that  looks  beyond  unemployment  exits  providing  a  comprehensive 
evaluation  of  beneﬁt  sanctions. 
In  terms  of  ex  post  eﬀects,  we  ﬁnd  that  both  warnings  and  actual  enforcement  of  beneﬁt 
sanctions  increase  the  unemployment  exit  rate.  Whereas  warnings  do  not  aﬀect  the  duration  of 
subsequent  employment  they have  a persistent  negative impact  on post-unemployment  earnings. 
Enforcement  of beneﬁt  sanctions  reduces  the quality  of post-unemployment jobs both in  terms  of 
42 Our  theoretical  explanation  in  Appendix  A  comprises  as  well  an  alternative  set-up  where  the  unemployed 
search for  a bad job  with low(er)  intensity  already before the enforcement  of  a sanction, but increase  search for 
these jobs  relatively  more  thereafter.  See footnote 47 for details. 33  6 Conclusions 
job duration as well as in terms of  earnings.  We also  ﬁnd evidence of beneﬁt  sanctions increasing 
exits out of  the labor market.  In terms of  ex ante eﬀects, we  ﬁnd  that stricter monitoring  of job 
search  leads  to  faster  exit  from  unemployment  but  also  reduces  post  unemployment  earnings 
while  leaving  employment  durations  unchanged. 
Beneﬁt  sanctions  not  only  reduce  unemployment  durations  but  also  reduce  post­
unemployment  employment  duration  and  earnings.  As  for  the  ﬁnancial  consequences  there 
is a tradeoﬀ between the positive eﬀect of  ﬁnding  a job  sooner rather than collecting  unemploy­
ment beneﬁts for a longer period  of time, and the negative eﬀect of  ﬁnding  a less well-paid job 
with  a  shorter  duration.  Using  our  estimation  results  we  are  able  to  quantify  this  tradeoﬀ.  We 
show  that  over  a  period  of  two  years  following  the  exit  from  unemployment,  the  net  eﬀect  of 
beneﬁt  sanctions  is  negative.  For  sanctioned  workers,  the  loss  in  earnings  is  in  the  order  of  two 
months whereas the gain from shorter unemployment duration is about  one month.  We also  ﬁnd 
substantial  ex  ante  eﬀects:  Increasing  monitoring  and  thus  the  warning  intensity  to  a  minimum 
standard,  which  lies  one  standard  deviation  above  the  mean,  reduces  unemployment  duration 
with  10  days  and  also  reduces  post-unemployment  earnings.  The  net  income  eﬀect  amounts  to 
a  loss  of  4  days  of  earnings,  a  small  eﬀect  compared  to  the  ex  post  eﬀect  of  beneﬁt  sanctions.  A 
further,  interesting  observation  is  that  an  intensiﬁed  warning  policy  may  reduce  labor  force  ex­
its.  Taken together, these  results indicate that increased  monitoring  harms post-unemployment 
earnings  substantially  less  than  actually  imposing  beneﬁt  sanctions. 
Turning  to policy  options,  recall  that beneﬁt  sanctions in the Swiss  system  entail full  reduc­
tion  of  unemployment  beneﬁts.  We  show  that  these  full  reductions  in  unemployment  beneﬁts 
lead  to  substantially  lower  post  unemployment  earnings.  Moreover,  we  show  that  increased 
monitoring  is  eﬀective in generating  incentives to leave  unemployment  without inﬂicting  a large 
post unemployment penalty  on job  seekers.  Taken together, these results suggests that an  al­
ternative  policy  could  be  constructed  that  preserves  search  incentives  but  moderates  the  post 
unemployment consequences of beneﬁts sanctions:  a system with increased  monitoring  of  search 
behavior  but  decreased  penalties  in  case  of  non-compliance. 34  6 Conclusions 
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Appendices
 
A. Beneﬁt sanctions and the quality  of post-unemployment jobs  –  theoretical 
notions 
The  Swiss  data  allow  us  to  make  a  distinction  between  warnings  and  enforcement  of  beneﬁt 
sanctions.  Furthermore, the data  contains information  about the quality  of post-unemployment 
jobs.  To illustrate how beneﬁt  sanctions  may  aﬀect  the quality  of post-unemployment jobs  we 
extend the beneﬁt  sanctions part  of the  search-matching  model  of Boone  and Van Ours (2006) 
accordingly.43  Workers  are  assumed  to  be  risk-neutral  and  cannot  save;  hence  they  consume 
all  their  income  each  period.  This  assumption  rules  out  the  possibility  that  agents  save  to 
insure  themselves  against  the  loss  of  income  due  to  unemployment.  Once  a  worker  becomes 
unemployed, he receives  an unemployment beneﬁt that is  constant  over the  unemployment spell 
unless  a  beneﬁt  sanction  is  imposed  in  which  case  the  beneﬁts  are  canceled.  Workers  have  only 
one  instrument  of  search,  their  search  intensity.44  Diﬀerent from Boone  and Van Ours (2006) 
we  introduce  two  sanction  “states”:  the  warning  state  and  the  enforcement  state.  Thus  there 
are three types of  unemployment:  unemployment  without beneﬁt  sanctions (u1),  unemployment 
with  a  warning (u2)  and  unemployment  with  sanctions imposed (u3).  Also diﬀerent from Boone 
and Van Ours (2006),  to investigate  the  relationship between beneﬁt  sanction  and  the quality 
of post-unemployment jobs  we introduce two types  of jobs:  temporary  and permanent jobs.  So 
there  are two types  of  employment, permanent (e1)  and  temporary (e2).  The jobs pay  the same 
wage  w  and diﬀer  only  in the job destruction  rate  δ1 < δ2. 45 
Unemployed  workers  receive  unemployment  beneﬁts  b,  with  b  ≤  w  being  the  replacement 
rate.  Unemployed  workers  are  looking  for  job  oﬀers  and  as  soon  as  they  get  one  they  will 
accept  it.  Thus  the  unemployed  have  only  one  instrument  of  search,  their  search  intensity.  An 
unemployed  worker is  assumed to  search for both types  of jobs with search intensities  s1  ≥  0 
and  s2 ≥  0.  The  disutility  of  searching  at  intensity  s  equals  γ(s),  such  that  γ(s1) =  1 
2 γs1
2  and 
1 γ(s2) =  2 γs2
2,  with  γ >  0.  So  the  disutility  of  search  increases  with  the  search  intensity  with  an 
increasing  marginal  disutility. 
The search for the jobs generates  ﬂows of job oﬀers, which follow a Poisson process with  arrival 
rate  µ1s1  and  µ2s2.  The  arrival  rates  of job  oﬀers  consist  of two parts,  one part (µ1  and  µ2) is 
determined  by  the  state  of  the  labor  market  i.e.  the  number  of  vacancies  and  unemployed  and 
the  other part (s1 and  s2) is  determined  by  the  optimizing  behavior  of  the  unemployed  worker. 
43 We  ignore  wage  bargaining,  vacancy  creation,  matching  of  unemployed  and  vacancies  and  payment  of  bene­
ﬁts/taxes.  Thus  we  focus  on  the  behavior  of  unemployed  workers  and  how  this  is  aﬀected  by  beneﬁt  sanctions. 
44 Note  that  we  could  introduce  two  margins  of  search,  search  intensity  and  replacement  rate.  This  would 
complicate  matters  a  lot  with  no  obvious  advantages.  One  could  even  argue  that  reservation  wages  are  already 
at  the  lower  end  of  the  wage  distribution. 
45 Note  that  the  introduction  of  two  wages  would  be  straightforward,  for  example  w1  > w2.  This  would  not 
change the results  very  much  except for allowing for the possibility that some post-unemployment jobs pay less 
than others.  Now the main diﬀerence between the two jobs is that  one doesn’t last  as long  as the other.  Therefore, 
in  expectation  the  earnings  –  taking  into  account  that  the  wage  is  paid  over  a  shorter  time  period  –  are  lower. 37 
Unemployed  without  a  beneﬁt  sanction  are  monitored  and  they  face  the  risk  of  receiving  a 
warning  if  they  search  less  than  required.  The  monitoring  intensity  is  φ1,  and  the  required 
intensity  of  search  equals  λ.  Workers  will  never  search  more  than  required:  s1 + s2 ≤  λ. 
Now  the  following  Bellman  equation  can  be  derived  for  the  unemployed  workers  without  a 
beneﬁt  sanction,  with  Vu1  denoting  the  expected  discounted  vale  of  being  unemployed  without 
a  beneﬁt  sanction: 
ρVu1 =  maxs{b − γ(s) + µ1s1(Ve1 − Vu1) + µ2s2(Ve2 − Vu1) + φ1(λ − s1 − s2)(Vu2 − Vu1)}  (11) 
where  Ve1 is  the  value  of being employed  with  a permanent job,  Ve2 is  the  value  of being employed 
with  a  temporary job,  Vu2  is  the  value  of  being  unemployment  with  a  sanction  warning  and  ρ 
is  the  discount  rate.  The  ﬂow  value  of  unemployment  without  beneﬁt  sanctions  consists  of  two 
parts:  the  ﬂow of  utility during  unemployment (utility  of beneﬁts minus search  costs)  and the 
expected  ﬂow of  additional income after the job is found.  The optimal  search intensities follow 
directly  from diﬀerentiating  equation (11): 
∗  s  = [µ1(Ve1 − Vu1) + φ1(Vu1 − Vu2)]/γ  11 
∗  s  = [µ2(Ve2 − Vu1) + φ1(Vu1 − Vu2)]/γ  12 
∗ ∗ with  s  12) representing  the  optimal  search intensity for  type 1 (type 2) jobs in  unemployment  11 (s 
state  1.  So,  the  optimal  search  intensity  increases  with  the  diﬀerence  between  the  values  of 
employment  and  unemployment  without  beneﬁt  sanctions,  the  monitoring  intensity  and  the 
diﬀerence  between  the  value  of  unemployment  without  beneﬁt  sanctions  and  unemployment 
with  a  sanction  warning.  Furthermore,  optimal  search  intensities  are  higher  when  search  costs 
are lower  and  more job  oﬀers  arrive.  Also  note that if there  was  no  system  of beneﬁt  sanctions 
∗∗  ∗ the  optimal  search  intensities  would  be  lower  with  for  example  s  =  µ1(Ve1 −  Vu1)/γ  ≤  s 11  11. 
∗ ∗∗  ∗ ∗∗  The  diﬀerences  s s11 and  s s12 represent  the  ex  ante  eﬀect  of  beneﬁt  sanctions.  11 − 12 −
The  Bellman  equation  for  the  unemployed  workers  with  a  sanction  warning:46 
ρVu2 =  maxs{b − γ(s) + µ1s1(Ve1 − Vu2) + µ2s2(Ve2 − Vu2) + φ2(λ − s1 − s2)(Vu3 − Vu2)}  (12) 
where  φ2  is  the  monitoring intensity in  unemployment  state 2 (φ2  ≤  φ1)  and  Vu3  is  the  value 
of  unemployment  in  the  sanction  state.  The  optimal  search  intensities  can  again  be  found  by 
diﬀerentiating  equation (12): 
∗  s  = [µ1(Ve1 − Vu2) + φ2(Vu2 − Vu3)]/γ  21 
∗  s  = [µ2(Ve2 − Vu2) + φ2(Vu2 − Vu3)]/γ  22 
∗ ∗  ∗ ∗ Note  that  the diﬀerences  s  11 and  s  21 represent  the  ex post  eﬀect  of  a  warning.  Finally,  21 −s  22 −s 
46 Now,  we  don’t  introduce  a  perceived  penalty  of  receiving  a  warning.  we  could  introduce  psychological  costs 
or disutility but I think it is nicer to have just the increased  monitoring intensity  “doing  the job”. 38 
the  Bellman  equation  for  the  unemployed  workers  with  a  sanction  enforced: 
ρVu3 =  maxs{−γ(s) + µ1s1(Ve1 − Vu3) + µ2s2(Ve2 − Vu3)}  (13) 
where  the  penalty  imposed  is  equal  to  the  beneﬁts.  We  assume  that  unemployed  with  a  beneﬁt 
sanction  are  no  longer  monitored  because  their  beneﬁts  are  equal  to  zero.  Once  again,  the 
optimal  search intensities  can be found by  diﬀerentiating  equation (13): 
∗  s  =  µ1(Ve1 − Vu3)/γ  31 
∗  s  =  µ2(Ve2 − Vu3)/γ  32 
∗ ∗  ∗ ∗ Note  that  the  diﬀerences  s  11 and  s  12 represent  the  ex  post  eﬀect  of  the  imposition  of  31 −s  32 −s 
a  beneﬁt  sanction.  For  the  employed  workers  the  following  Bellman  equations  hold: 
ρVe1 =  w  +  δ1(Vu1 − Ve1)  (14) 
ρVe2 =  w  +  δ2(Vu1 − Ve2)  (15) 
These  equations  says  that  the  ﬂow  value  of  being  employed  for  a  worker  equals  the  utility  from 
the  wage  he  receives  each  period  plus  the  rate  in  which  the  match  is  dissolved,  in  which  case 
he  becomes  unemployed  and  receives  Vu  instead  of  Ve1  or  Ve2.  Now,  if  the  following  inequality 
holds: 
Ve1 > Vu1 > Vu2 > Ve2 > Vu3  (16) 
workers  will initially  only  search for jobs  of type 1.  Receiving  a  warning  will induce them to 
search  with  a higher intensity for jobs  of  type 1, but they  will  still  not look for jobs  of  type 2. 
Only  once they get  a beneﬁt  sanction imposed  will they  start looking  for jobs  of type 2.  Then, 
their average  expected job duration will be lower because now they  start accepting  temporary 
jobs.47 
B.  Simulations 
B1.  Ex  post  eﬀects 
We  simulate  the  ex  post  eﬀect  of  a  beneﬁt  sanction  as  follows.  First,  we  look  at  earnings  over 
Dw,Ds 24  months  after  unemployment  exit  as  outcome.  Let  θ (t|x,v) denote  the  earnings  hazard,  y24 
depending  on  sanction  warning  status  Dw  and  sanction  enforcement  status  Ds.  The  density  of 
earnings  realizations (for the group  of individuals  with positive  medium  run  earnings)  is 
Dw,Ds  Dw,Ds  Dw,Ds f (y|x,v) =  θ (y|x,v)S (y|x,v).  y24  y24  y24 
47 Note that in this  set-up  only  unemployed  with  a beneﬁt  sanction  would  search for  a temporary job.  Alterna­
tively  we  could  have:  Ve1 > Ve2 > Vu1 > Vu2 > Vu3.  Then,  unemployed  initially  search  with  a  lower  intensity  for 
jobs  of  type  2.  Due  to  the  convexity  of  the  search  costs  function,  at  the  points  in  time  when  they  get  a  sanction 




Based  on  this  density,  we  can  compute  the  expected  earnings  as  follows:
 
199  199 
Dw,Ds  Dw,Ds E(y|x,v,Dw,Ds) =  y f (y|x,v)dy  + 1 −  f (y|x,v)dy  ·  200  (17)  y24  y24 
0 0 
whereby  y  is  earnings in 1000 CHF. The  second  term  of  the  equation (17)  above  accounts for 
the high  earnings censored  at 200,000 CHF. In the treated  case, i.e.  with both  sanction warning 
and  enforcement  imposed,  we  set  Dw  = 1  and  Ds  = 1.  This  amounts  to  increasing  the  earnings 
hazard  in  (17)  by  the  estimated  treatment  eﬀects  δwy24t  and  δsy24t  over  the  whole  support. 
In  the  non-treated  counterfactual,  equation  (17)  is  evaluated  at  Dw  =  0  and  Ds  =  0.  The 
diﬀerence  between  these  two  mean  earnings  results  in  the  ex  post  eﬀect.  Note  that  we  simulate 
ﬁrst  conditional  on  unobserved  heterogeneity  and  then  we  integrate  unobserved  heterogeneity 
out. 
Now,  secondly,  we  describe  the  simulation  of  the  unemployment  durations,  separated  by 
Dw,Ds the  two  exit  destinations.  Let  θy  (t|x,v)  denote  the  transition  rate  from  unemployment  to 
positive income y, depending on  sanction  warning  status  Dw  and  sanction  enforcement  Ds  status. 
Dw,Ds Also,  θ0  (t|x,v) is  the  transition  rate  from  unemployment  to  no  medium  run  earnings.  The 
density  of  unemployment  spells  ending  in  a  transition  to  y  is 
fDw,Ds  θDw,Ds  Dw,Ds (t|x,v) =  (t|x,v)SDw,Ds(t|x,v)S (t|x,v), y  y y  0 
i.e.  the  proportion  having  survived  without  exit  until  t,  making  a transition to  a job  at time 
t.  The  density  of  unemployment  spells  ending  in  a  transition  to  0  is  deﬁned  in  an  analogous 
manner. 
We can  now calculate the proportion of individuals making  a transition to a paid job between 
time  0  and  time  c.  This  amounts  to  summing  up  transitions  occurring  at  times  between  0  and 
c,  i.e. 
c 
FDw,Ds  fDw(t),Ds(t) (c|x,v) =  (t|x,v)dt  y y 
0 
We  take  actual  realizations  of  time  to  warning  tw  and  time  to  enforcement  ts  as  observed 
in  the  dataset.  This  means  that  we  simulate  the  eﬀect  of  sanctions  on  time  remaining  in 
unemployment  after  a  sanction  warning.  This  expected  duration  has  to  be  constructed  using 
a  conditional  version  of  density  fy  where  conditioning  reﬂects (i)  the fact that  we  only  observe 
spells until day 720, and (ii)  that  – being interested in the average treatment  eﬀect  on the treated 
(ATET) –  we  focus  on  individuals  who  have  survived  in  unemployment  until  time  tw  without  a 
sanction  warning.  Duration  to  paid  employment  with  both  a  sanction  warning  and  a  sanction 
enforcement  is 
�  720  1,Ds(t) fy  (t|x,v)
E(ty|x,v,Dw  = 1,Ds(t),tw  < Ty  <  720)  =  t  dt  (18) 
720  1,Ds(t)
tw  fy  (t|x,v)dt  tw � 
�  �  �  � 
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the  counterfactual  duration  is  simulated  setting  both  treatment  eﬀects  in  this  expression  to 
zero. 
720  0,0 fy  (t|x,v)
E(ty|x,v,Dw  = 0,Ds  = 0,tw  < Ty  <  720)  =  t �  dt  (19)  720  0,0 
tw  fy  (t|x,v)dt  tw 
Substituting  fy  by  f0  generates  the  corresponding  mean  duration  from  unemployment  to 
non-paid  post  unemployment. 
The  ex post eﬀect  of beneﬁt  sanctions is  the diﬀerence between  actual  mean duration (18)  and 
counterfactual  mean duration (19).  Note again that we simulate  ﬁrst conditional  on unobserved 
heterogeneity  and  then  we  integrate  unobserved  heterogeneity  out. 
B2.  Simulating  the  ex  ante  eﬀect 
We  simulate the  ex  ante  eﬀect  on the post-unemployment  outcome by  focusing  on everyone  who 
generated  positive  earnings  over  24  months  after  unemployment  exit.  We  set  their  sanction  sta­
Dw,Ds,αe24y tuses  Dw  and  Ds  to  zero.  Now,  let  θ (y|x,v) denote  the  earnings hazard, depending on  y24 
sanction  warning  status  Dw,  sanction  enforcement  Ds  status,  and  the vector  of PES dummies in 
the  outcome,  αe24y. The counterfactual  of  expected  earnings under actual  warning intensity  and 
outcome  dummies,  implying  αe
0
24y  =  α ˆe24y, is described by  equation (17)  above,  now  evaluated 
for  the  whole  y24  >  0  group. 
The  experiment  we  evaluate  is  an  increase in  the  warning intensity  by  one  standard deviation 
for  all PES  which  are below the mean warning intensity plus  one  standard deviation.  This leads 
to  an  increase  in  the  PES  dummy  in  the  post-unemployment  earnings  process  on  the  order  of 
α1 
e24y  =  α ˆe24y  +  δ ˆmax(α ¯ ˆw  +  σα ˆw  − α ˆw,0) 
where  δ  is  the  regression  coeﬃcient  from  the  respective  ex  ante  eﬀect  regression.  Expected 
earnings  with  the  increased  warning  regime  is 
199  199  0,0,α1  0,0,α1 
e24y e24y E(y|x,v,Dw  = 0,Ds  = 0,α1  ) =  y f  (y|x,v)dy+ 1 −  f  (y|x,v)dy  ·200. e24y y24  y24 
0 0 
The  diﬀerence  between  the  expected  earnings  under  the  two  regimes  represents  the  ex  ante 
ATET  for  the  post-unemployment  outcome. 
The  ex  ante  eﬀect  on  unemployment  duration  is  simulated  by  focusing  on  everyone’s  dura­
Dw,Ds,αe24y tion  without  a  sanction.  Let  θy  (t|x,v) denote  the  transition  rate  from  unemployment 
to  positive  income  y.  Expected  duration  to  paid  employment  with  actual  warning  intensity, 
implying  α0 =  α ˆy,  is  y 
�  0,0,α0 
720  y fy  (t|x,v)
E(ty|x,v,Dw  = 0,Ds  = 0,α0 ,Ty  <  720)  =  t  (20)  y �  720  0,0,αy 
0 
0  fy  (t|x,v)dt  0 41 
Doing  the  same  experiment  by  increasing  the  warning  intensity  as  described  above  results  in 
an  increase  in  the  PES  dummy  in  the  unemployment  to  paid  employment  process  by 
α1 
y  =  α ˆy  +  δ ˆmax(α ¯ ˆw  + σα ˆw  − α ˆw,0). 
Expected  duration  with  the  increased  warning  regime  is 
�  720  0,0,α1 
fy 
y(t|x,v)
E(ty|x,v,Dw  = 0,Ds  = 0,α1 ,Ty  <  720)  =  t	  (21)  y	 �  720  0,0,αy 
1 
0  fy  (t|x,v)dt  0 
The  ex  ante  eﬀect  on  unemployment  duration  with  exit  in  employment  consists  in 
the  diﬀerence  between  the  equations  (21)  and  (20).  The  respective  eﬀect  on  unemployment 
duration that  ends in medium run non-employment is calculated  analogously,  replacing  fy  by  f0. 
C.  Tables 
Tab. 7:	 The  eﬀect  of  beneﬁt  sanctions  on  exit  behavior  and  subsequent  non-/employment  dura­
tion 
−→  see  next  page 42 
Model  I  Model  II 
(Coeﬀ./Transf.)  Coeﬀ.  z-value  Transf.  Coeﬀ.  z-value  Transf. 
Eﬀect  on  exit  from  employment  (M) 
warning  (δwm/in  %)  0.018  0.34  0.019 
enforcement  (δsm/in  %)  0.140  2.35  0.150 
Eﬀect  on  exit  from  non-empl.  (NM) 
warning  (δwnm/in  %)  0.146  1.14  0.157 
enforcement  (δsnm/in  %)  0.267  1.97  0.307 
Eﬀect  on  exit  UE  →  E 
warning  (δwe/in  %)  0.158  3.48  0.171  0.147  3.39  0.159 
enforcement  (δse/in  %)  0.149  2.98  0.161  0.148  3.07  0.160 
Eﬀect  on  exit  UE  →  NE 
warning  (δwne/in  %)  0.637  4.69  0.890  0.689  5.05  0.992 
enforcement  (δsne/in  %)  0.515  4.10  0.674  0.513  4.05  0.670 
Transition  rate:  exit  from  M 
λma,1/exp(uma)  -1.962  -3.56  3.832 
λmb,1/exp(umb)  -4.557  -5.27  0.286 
Transition  rate:  exit  from  NM 
λnma,1/exp(unma)  -0.367  -0.23  2.932 
λnmb,1 /exp(unmb)  2.022  1.28  31.972 
Transition  rate:  exit  to  E 
λea,1/exp(uea)  -5.309  -13.58  0.183  -5.321  -13.48  0.183 
λeb,1/exp(ueb)  -6.446  -15.76  0.059  -6.478  -15.70  0.058 
Transition  rate:  exit  to  NE 
λnea,1/exp(unea)  -2.704  -2.67  0.052  -2.790  -2.69  0.052 
λneb,1 /exp(uneb)  -5.256  -5.08  0.004  -5.342  -5.08  0.004 
Transition  rate:  warning 
λwa,1/exp(uwa)  -5.060  -4.81  0.181  -5.151  -4.77  0.181 
λwb,1 /exp(uwb)  -9.277  -8.66  0.003  -9.373  -8.54  0.003 
Transition  rate:  enforcement 
λsa,1/exp(usa)  -3.316  -2.13  0.441  -3.382  -2.07  0.447 
λsb,1/exp(usb)  -100  –  0  -100  –  0 
Probabilities 
a1/p1  4.202  2.06  0.141  a1/p1  2.937  2.87  0.088 
a2/p2  3.038  1.51  0.044  a2/p2  1.494  0.95  0.021 
a3/p3  1.057  0.26  0.006  a3/p3  1.334  1.12  0.018 
a4/p4  1.145  0.48  0.007  a5/p5  3.645  3.72  0.178 
a5/p5  4.565  2.23  0.202  a6/p6  1.927  1.69  0.032 
a6/p6  3.617  1.83  0.078  a7/p7  1.481  1.32  0.020 
a7/p7  2.604  1.25  0.028  a9/p9  2.026  0.72  0.035 
a8/p8  -1.066  -0.17  0.001  a11/p11  3.650  3.42  0.179 
a9/p9  2.940  0.87  0.040  a13/p13  2.656  2.40  0.066 
a11/p11  4.932  2.38  0.292  a17/p17  2.168  2.10  0.041 
a13/p13  4.331  2.10  0.160  a18/ p18  0.467  0.33  0.007 
a16/p16  –  –  0.002  a22/ p22  0.786  0.40  0.010 
a24/ p24  -0.008  -0.01  0.005 
a27/ p27  3.287  3.47  0.124 
a34/ p34  1.218  0.63  0.016 
a37/ p37  2.135  2.02  0.039 
a38/ p38  1.983  2.06  0.034 
a45/ p45  2.887  2.91  0.083 
a64/ p64  –  –  0.005 
Unobserved  heterogeneity  Yes  Yes 
Control  variables  Yes  Yes 
Control  for  state  dependence  Yes  Yes 
PES  dummies  Yes  Yes 
-Log-Likelihood  198309  255064 
BIC  200982  259158 
N  23961  23961 
Notes:  We  report  coeﬃcients  and  their  transformations:  Transformed  treatment  eﬀects  are  changes  in 
%.  Transition  rates  are  in  %  per  day  (exception:  M/NM  in  %  per  month),  suitable  for  the  ﬁrst  split 
period  of the piecewise  constant hazards (see  respective footnotes);  the transformations  are  calculated for 
′ ′  ′  an  ”average”  individual:  ujg  =  λjg,1 +  vjg  +  x ¯ βj  +  r ¯ αj  +  p ¯ γj  where  j  =  {m,nm,e,ne,w,s},  g  =  {a,b}
 
and the bars  are means,  except for the past  earnings variables in the state dependence (p)  where  we  use
 
medians.  Asymptotic  z-values.  Other  probabilities  are  zero.
 
Source:  Own  estimations  based  on  merged  UIR-SSA  database.
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Tab. 8:	 The  eﬀect  of  beneﬁt  sanctions  on  earnings:  over  1  vs.  24  months  after  unemployment 
exit;  E (exit to  employment)  group 
Model  III:  earn  1  mt  Model  III:  earn  24  mt 
(Coeﬀ./Transf.)  Coeﬀ.  z-value  Transf.  Coeﬀ.  z-value  Transf. 
Eﬀect  on  earnings  over  1/24  mt 
warning  (δwy1/in  %)  0.077  2.40  0.080  δwy24/%  0.102  3.27  0.107 
enforcement  (δsy1/in  %)  0.050  1.18  0.051  δsy24/%  0.076  1.78  0.079 
Eﬀect  on  exit  UE  →  E 
warning  (δwe/in  %)  0.154  3.41  0.167  0.154  3.39  0.167 
enforcement  (δse/in  %)  0.152  3.02  0.165  0.147  2.93  0.159 
Eﬀect  on  exit  UE  →  NE 
warning  (δwne/in  %)  0.612  4.66  0.843  0.625  4.66  0.869 
enforcement  (δsne/in  %)  0.522  4.16  0.686  0.518  4.12  0.679 
Earnings  realisation  rate  for  Y1/24 
λy1a,1/exp(uy1a)  -3.008  -7.31  4.613  λ/exp(uy24a)  -5.094  -12.41  0.352 
λy1b,1/exp(uy1b)  -4.785  -11.37  0.781  λ/exp(uy24b)  -7.311  -16.49  0.038 
Transition  rate:  exit  to  E 
λea,1/exp(uea)  -5.302  -13.51  0.183  -5.312  -13.54  0.183 
λeb,1/exp(ueb)  -6.442  -15.69  0.059  -6.430  -15.68  0.060 
Transition  rate:  exit  to  NE 
λnea,1/exp(unea)  -2.686  -2.66  0.051  -2.734  -2.70  0.052 
λneb,1/exp(uneb)  -5.308  -5.11  0.004  -5.303  -5.12  0.004 
Transition  rate:  warning 
λwa,1/exp(uwa)  -5.083  -4.81  0.181  -5.055  -4.79  0.180 
λwb,1/exp(uwb)  -9.300  -8.66  0.003  -9.276  -8.64  0.003 
Transition  rate:  enforcement 
λsa,1/exp(usa)  -3.323  -2.12  0.448  -3.300  -2.11  0.443 
λsb,1/exp(usb)  -100  –  0  -100  –  0 
Probabilities 
a1/p1  4.102  3.34  0.148  a1/p1  4.158  5.21  0.146 
a2/p2  2.907  2.37  0.045  a2/p2  2.948  3.55  0.044 
a3/p3  1.301  0.48  0.009  a3/p3  0.822  0.19  0.005 
a4/p4  1.003  0.58  0.007  a4/p4  1.189  0.85  0.008 
a5/p5  4.291  3.47  0.179  a5/p5  4.441  5.68  0.194 
a6/p6  3.407  2.89  0.074  a6/p6  3.511  4.51  0.077 
a7/p7  2.471  1.90  0.029  a7/p7  2.552  2.80  0.029 
a8/p8  -1.562  -0.18  0.001  a8/p8  -1.852  -0.15  0.000 
a9/p9  3.069  1.26  0.053  a9/p9  2.826  0.92  0.039 
a11/p11  4.741  3.74  0.281  a11/p11  4.848  5.84  0.291 
a13/p13  4.099  3.34  0.148  a13/p13  4.236  5.34  0.158 
a21/p21  1.759  1.51  0.014  a21/p21  0.689  0.74  0.005 
a22/p22  -0.218  -0.10  0.002  a22/p22  -0.127  -0.10  0.002 
a29/p29  1.233  0.82  0.008  a32/ p32  –  –  0.002 
a32/p32  –  –  0.002 
Unobserved  heterogeneity  Yes  Yes 
Control  variables  Yes  Yes 
Control  for  state  dependence  Yes  Yes 
PES  dummies  Yes  Yes 
-Log-Likelihood  231704  289436 
BIC  235077  292804 
N  23961  23961 
Notes:  We  report  coeﬃcients  and  their  transformations:  Transformed  treatment  eﬀects  are  changes  in
 
%.  Transition  rates  are  in  %  per  day  (earnings  Y1/24:  in  %  per  1000  CHF),  suitable  for  the  ﬁrst  split
 
period  of the piecewise  constant hazards (see  respective footnotes);  the transformations  are  calculated for
 
an  ”average”  individual:  ujg  =  λjg,1 +  vjg  +  x ¯
′ βj  +  r ¯
′ αj  +  p ¯
′ γj  where  j =  {y1,y24,e,ne,w,s},  g  =  {a,b}
 
and the bars  are means,  except for the past earnings in the state dependence (p) where  we  use  medians.
 
Asymptotic  z-values.  Other  probabilities  are  zero.
 
Source:  Own  estimations  based  on  merged  UIR-SSA  database.
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Tab. 9:	 The  eﬀect of beneﬁt  sanctions  on  earnings  over 24  months:  E group (excluding temporary 
and permanent labor force  exits)  vs.  total population  with positive  earnings (excluding 
only  permanent  labor  force  exits) 
Model  III:  earn  24  mt  Model  IV:  earn  24  mt 
(Coeﬀ./Transf.)  Coeﬀ.  z-value  Transf.  Coeﬀ.  z-value  Transf. 
Eﬀect  on  earnings  over  24  mt 
warning  (δwy24/in  %)  0.102  3.27  0.107  δwy24t/%  0.117  4.02  0.124 
enforcement  (δsy24/in  %)  0.076  1.78  0.079  δsy24t/%  0.104  2.66  0.109 
Eﬀect  on  exit  UE  →  E/Y 
warning  (δwe/in  %)  0.154  3.39  0.167  δwy/%  0.181  4.33  0.198 
enforcement  (δse/in  %)  0.147  2.93  0.159  δsy/%  0.211  4.55  0.235 
Eﬀect  on  exit  UE  →  NE/0 
warning  (δwne/in  %)  0.625  4.66  0.869  δw0/%  0.830  2.59  1.294 
enforcement  (δsne/in  %)  0.518  4.12  0.679  δs0/%  0.294  1.73  0.342 
Earnings  realisation  rate  for  Y24/24t 
λy24a,1/exp(uy24a)  -5.094  -12.41  0.352  λ/exp(uy24ta)  -4.696  -12.24  0.418 
λy24b,1/exp(uy24b)  -7.311  -16.49  0.038  λ/exp(uy24tb)  -6.850  -16.09  0.048 
Transition  rate:  exit  to  E/Y 
λea,1/exp(uea)  -5.312  -13.54  0.183  λ/exp(uya)  -4.797  -12.70  0.211 
λeb,1/exp(ueb)  -6.430  -15.68  0.060  λ/exp(uyb)  -5.887  -15.06  0.071 
Transition  rate:  exit  to  NE/0 
λnea,1/exp(unea)  -2.734  -2.70  0.052  λ/exp(u0a)  -4.785  – 
1  0.002 
λneb,1/exp(uneb)  -5.303  -5.12  0.004  λ/exp(u0b)  -2.812  -6.29  0.011 
Transition  rate:  warning 
λwa,1/exp(uwa)  -5.055  -4.79  0.180  -5.086  -4.85  0.181 
λwb,1/exp(uwb)  -9.276  -8.64  0.003  -9.261  -8.68  0.003 
Transition  rate:  enforcement 
λsa,1/exp(usa)  -3.300  -2.11  0.443  -3.358  -2.17  0.446 
λsb,1/exp(usb)  -100  –  0  -100  –  0 
Probabilities 
a1/p1  4.158  5.21  0.146  a1/p1  4.473  5.59  0.241 
a2/p2  2.948  3.55  0.044  a2/p2  3.561  4.59  0.097 
a3/p3  0.822  0.19  0.005  a3/p3  2.744  3.54  0.043 
a4/p4  1.189  0.85  0.008  a5/p5  3.527  3.14  0.094 
a5/p5  4.441  5.68  0.194  a6/p6  2.160  1.62  0.024 
a6/p6  3.511  4.51  0.077  a8/p8  0.570  0.47  0.005 
a7/p7  2.552  2.80  0.029  a9/p9  2.397  0.48  0.030 
a8/p8  -1.852  -0.15  0.000  a11/p11  3.949  4.34  0.143 
a9/p9  2.826  0.92  0.039  a13/p13  4.736  5.46  0.314 
a11/p11  4.848  5.84  0.291  a17/p17  0.175  0.16  0.003 
a13/p13  4.236  5.34  0.158  a18/p18  0.248  0.27  0.004 
a21/p21  0.689  0.74  0.005  a32/ p32  –  –  0.003 
a22/p22  -0.127  -0.10  0.002 
a32/ p32  –  –  0.002 
Unobserved  heterogeneity  Yes  Yes 
Control  variables  Yes  Yes 
Control  for  state  dependence  Yes  Yes 
PES  dummies  Yes  Yes 
-Log-Likelihood  231704  294752 
BIC  235077  298110 
N  23961  23961 
Notes:  We  report  coeﬃcients  and  their  transformations:  Transformed  treatment  eﬀects  are  changes  in 
%.  Transition  rates are in % per day (earnings Y24/24t: in % per 1000 CHF), suitable for the  ﬁrst split 
period  of the piecewise  constant hazards (see  respective footnotes);  the transformations  are  calculated for 
′ ′  ′  an  ”average”  individual:  ujg  =  λjg,1 +vjg  +x ¯ βj  +r ¯ αj  +p ¯ γj  where  j =  {y24,y24t,e,ne,w,s},  g  =  {a,b}
 
and the bars are  means,  except for the past earnings in the state dependence (p) where  we  use  medians.
 
Asymptotic z-values.  Other probabilities  are  zero. 
1) Constant  could  not be estimated in  ﬁnal  model,  value
 
ﬁxed.  Its  value  was  estimated  from  a  version  of  the  model  with  ﬁxed  probabilities.
 
Source:  Own  estimations  based  on  merged  UIR-SSA  database.
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D.  Observables 
In  the following  table  we provide  means (or  medians in  the  case  of durations) for  all  the  variables 
used  in  the  estimated  Models  I  to  IV  (see  section  4  for  a  description  of  the  models).  The 
means  are given for the total  sample  as  well  as for the treatment  subgroups:  the non-sanctioned 
(non-sanc),  those  who  were  warned  only  (warn  only),  and  those  who  were  warned  and  got  a 
beneﬁt  sanction  imposed  (warn&enf).  The  variables  below,  except  the  last  two  paragraphs, 
are  the  control  variables  which  are  present  in  all  the  Models  I  to  IV.  The  post-unemployment 
outcome  Models  II  to  IV  feature  as  well  the  endogenous  state  dependence  variables  as  further 
controls.  Finally,  the last paragraph gives  a descriptive insight in how  outcome levels  are diﬀerent 
depending  on  in  which  treatment  subgroup  an  individual  is.  The  estimated  coeﬃcients  for  the 
control  variables  in  Models  I  to  IV  are  not  reported  in  this  paper  due  to  space  reasons.  They 
are  available  from  the  authors  upon  request. 
Tab. 10:  Observable  characteristics:  Means  by  sanction  status  group 
total  non-sanc  warn  only  warn&enf 
State  dependence:  past  earnings  &  employment 
Sum  of  earnings  mt  -25  to  -60  116809  120692  103443  97797 
Sum  of  earnings  mt  -13  to  -24  38928  40016  34562  34442 
Sum  of  earnings  mt  -7  to  -12  19300  19784  17302  17375 
Sum  of  earnings  mt  -2  to  -5  17450  17928  15802  15108 
Sum  of  earnings  mt  -1  3474  3573  3129  2988 
Sum  of  employed  months  mt  -25  to  -60  27.58  28.01  26.18  25.34 
Sum  of  employed  months  mt  -13  to  -24  9.23  9.31  8.87  8.94 
Sum  of  employed  months  mt  -7  to  -12  4.63  4.65  4.49  4.58 
Sum  of  employed  months  mt  -2  to  -5  4.21  4.23  4.18  4.10 
Sum  of  employed  months  mt  -1  0.85  0.85  0.84  0.80 
Sociodemographic  characteristics 
Qualiﬁcation:  semi-skilled  (or  skilled  w/o  (recognised)  certiﬁcate)  0.164  0.159  0.183  0.181 
Qualiﬁcation:  non-skilled  (base:  skilled  with  certiﬁcate)  0.266  0.254  0.318  0.315 
Age  39.9  40.0  39.4  39.3 
Age  squared  1641.9  1652.3  1603.1  1595.0 
Civil  status:  Married/separated  (base:  unmarried)  0.647  0.653  0.647  0.585 
Civil  status:  Widowed  0.010  0.010  0.010  0.006 
Civil  status:  Divorced  0.128  0.124  0.129  0.161 
Woman  (base:  man)  0.391  0.396  0.357  0.380 
Not  Swiss  (base:  Swiss)  0.444  0.433  0.506  0.469 
Language  region:  French-speaking  (base:  German-speaking)  0.682  0.693  0.659  0.609 
Language  region:  Italian-speaking  0.008  0.009  0.003  0.005 
Mother  tongue  not  the  one  of  language  region  0.444  0.435  0.503  0.455 
Skilled*non-Swiss  0.140  0.142  0.138  0.125 
Semi-skilled*non-Swiss  0.104  0.100  0.121  0.114 
Non-skilled*non-Swiss  0.198  0.189  0.244  0.225 
Parttime  unemployed  0.116  0.118  0.089  0.127 
Speaks  at  least  2  foreign  languages  0.381  0.387  0.345  0.369 
At  least  one  registered  UE  spell  in  2  years  before  observed  spell  0.092  0.091  0.094  0.103 
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total  non-sanc  warn  only  warn&enf 
Placeability
1 :  good  (base:  ”without  problems”)  0.131  0.137  0.104  0.107 
Placeability:  medium  0.732  0.732  0.746  0.719 
Placeability:  bad  0.099  0.091  0.116  0.144 
Placeability:  special  cases/hardly  placeable  0.011  0.010  0.016  0.010 
Residence  status:  foreigner  w.  yearly  residence  permit  (base:  Swiss)  0.143  0.135  0.185  0.157 
Residence  status:  foreigner  w.  permanent  residence  permit  0.285  0.284  0.295  0.278 
Residence  status:  asylum  seekers  (incl  refugees)  0.017  0.014  0.025  0.032 
Residence  status:  season  workers,  short  stayers,  rest  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.002 
Last  function:  self-employed,  incl  home  workers  (base:  professionals)  0.008  0.008  0.007  0.010 
Last  function:  management  0.062  0.069  0.034  0.039 
Last  function:  support  function  0.375  0.356  0.458  0.445 
Last  function:  students,incl  apprenticeship  0.005  0.005  0.004  0.003 
Household  size:  2  people  (incl  job  seeker;  base:  1  person)  0.239  0.240  0.220  0.247 
Household  size:  3  people  0.199  0.200  0.204  0.180 
Household  size:  4  people  0.217  0.220  0.209  0.194 
Household  size:  5  people  0.070  0.068  0.083  0.070 
Household  size:  6  people  0.028  0.026  0.039  0.029 
Household  size  2  *  woman  0.119  0.121  0.103  0.113 
Household  size  3  *  woman  0.075  0.075  0.080  0.066 
Household  size  4  *  woman  0.071  0.071  0.068  0.082 
Household  size  5  *  woman  0.017  0.016  0.017  0.024 
Household  size  6  *  woman  0.005  0.004  0.006  0.007 
Occupations  (base  category:  oﬃce,  administration,  accounting,  police,  military) 
Food  &  agriculture  occupations  0.041  0.042  0.041  0.039 
Blue-collar  manufacturing  (machines,  watches,  chemicals,...)  0.092  0.089  0.109  0.099 
Transportation,  travel,  telecom,  media,  print  0.055  0.053  0.063  0.063 
Construction,  carpenters  (wood  preparation)  0.154  0.155  0.172  0.119 
Engineers,  technicians  0.056  0.059  0.046  0.038 
Enterpreneurs,  directors,  chief  civil  servants,  lawyers  0.019  0.021  0.010  0.018 
Informatics  0.006  0.006  0.006  0.006 
Sales  0.068  0.070  0.052  0.073 
Marketing,  PR,  wealth  management,  insurance  0.012  0.012  0.012  0.010 
Gastronomy,  housekeeping,  cleaning,  personal  service  0.203  0.192  0.244  0.257 
Health  occupations  (incl  social  workers)  0.035  0.036  0.029  0.035 
Science  &  arts  0.028  0.030  0.021  0.021 
Education  0.026  0.027  0.021  0.024 
Students  (&  people  looking  for  apprenticeship)  0.005  0.005  0.004  0.004 
Rest  (mainly  unskilled  workers,  helpers)  0.080  0.075  0.093  0.103 
Beneﬁts:  Maximum  duration  of  eligibility  &  replacement  rate
2 
Maximum  of  passive  beneﬁt  days  >=  250  (base:  150  days)  0.170  0.175  0.148  0.146 
Maximum  of  passive  beneﬁt  days  =  75  0.020  0.019  0.023  0.027 
Replacement  rate  category:  70%  (base:  80%)  0.222  0.231  0.185  0.191 
Replacement  rate  category:  72%  0.012  0.011  0.017  0.012 
Replacement  rate  category:  74%  0.013  0.013  0.014  0.015 
Replacement  rate  category:  76%  0.010  0.010  0.010  0.008 
Replacement  rate  category:  78%  0.010  0.010  0.010  0.013 
PES  (regional  public  employment  service)  dummies  (base:  SOA1)
3 
AIA2  0.002  0.003  0.000  0.003 
FRB1  0.017  0.017  0.021  0.008 
FRC1  0.008  0.008  0.006  0.008 
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total  non-sanc  warn  only  warn&enf 
FRD1  0.010  0.011  0.008  0.005 
FRF1  0.011  0.013  0.005  0.004 
FRK1  0.005  0.005  0.004  0.004 
FRL1  0.031  0.032  0.027  0.021 
FRM1  0.019  0.017  0.039  0.011 
FRM4  0.002  0.002  0.004  0.005 
FRN1  0.009  0.011  0.005  0.002 
GRD1  0.042  0.039  0.023  0.093 
GRE1  0.009  0.009  0.008  0.018 
GRF1  0.009  0.008  0.003  0.024 
GRG1  0.005  0.006  0.001  0.003 
GRH1  0.010  0.010  0.005  0.012 
GRI1  0.015  0.015  0.010  0.022 
SOA2  0.016  0.015  0.020  0.024 
SOA3  0.022  0.021  0.026  0.029 
SOA4  0.009  0.010  0.006  0.006 
SOA5  0.016  0.015  0.019  0.018 
SOA6  0.009  0.011  0.002  0.007 
SOA7  0.005  0.003  0.007  0.027 
SOA8  0.003  0.003  0.002  0
4 
SOA9  0.006  0.005  0.006  0.007 
SOAA  0.010  0.011  0.006  0.005 
SOAB  0.018  0.019  0.011  0.020 
URA2  0.008  0.007  0.011  0.008 
VDB1  0.091  0.096  0.066  0.073 
VDB2  0.007  0.007  0.005  0.003 
VDC1  0.008  0.008  0.008  0.004 
VDD1  0.030  0.028  0.034  0.038 
VDD4  0.003  0.002  0.005  0.006 
VDE1  0.013  0.015  0.001  0.011 
VDH1  0.024  0.025  0.007  0.039 
VDJ1  0.022  0.025  0.009  0.005 
VDL1  0.040  0.040  0.039  0.050 
VDM1  0.015  0.013  0.019  0.020 
VDN1  0.005  0.006  0.001  0.002 
VDP1  0.023  0.026  0.012  0.005 
VDQ1  0.021  0.019  0.011  0.053 
VDT1  0.009  0.009  0.009  0.007 
VDU1  0.027  0.027  0.023  0.031 
VDV1  0.033  0.034  0.035  0.020 
VDW1  0.009  0.010  0.008  0.003 
VDZ1  0.006  0.006  0.007  0.007 
VSL1  0.026  0.020  0.050  0.050 
VSM1  0.052  0.051  0.077  0.036 
VSM2  0.004  0.004  0.003  0.000 
VSN1  0.053  0.047  0.113  0.029 
VSO1  0.021  0.024  0.004  0.017 
VSO2  0.045  0.053  0.003  0.032 
VSP1  0.080  0.071  0.164  0.055 
Endogenous  state  dependence:  duration  of  past  stage  (unemployment)
5 
Log  unemployment  duration  (median,  days)  5.10  5.00  5.38  5.73 
Log  unemployment  duration,  squared  (median,  days)  26.01  24.97  28.99  32.87 
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total  non-sanc  warn  only  warn&enf 
Log  unemployment  duration,  3rd  power  (median,  days)  132.6  124.8  156.1  188.5 
Log  unemployment  duration,  4th  power  (median,  days)  676.4  623.6  840.6  1080.5 
Log  unemployment  duration,  5th  power  (median,  days)  3449.8  3116.3  4526.1  6195.0 
Log  unemployment  duration,  6th  power  (median,  days)  17593.5  15572.8  24370.8  35517.9 
Outcomes  (dependent  variables  for  Models  I  to  IV)
6 
Unemployment  duration  164  148  218  309 
Duration  ﬁrst  spell  after  ue:  employment  (E:  19149  obs)  25  26  19  22 
Duration  ﬁrst  spell  after  ue:  nonemployment  (NE:  2985  obs)  11  10  16  12 
Earnings  in  the  ﬁrst  month  after  ue  exit  (E:  19149  obs)  89826.85  92364.93  79733.43  75292.16 
Earnings  over  24  months  after  ue  exit  (E:  19149  obs)  3992.41  4087.35  3611.41  3453.90 
Earnings  over  24  months  after  ue  exit  (Y:  21012  obs)  85954.90  88855.57  75708.11  69206.41 
Observations  23961  19228  2714  2019 
Notes:  Means for  each  subgroup  are  reported,  medians in the  case  of durations.  For dummy  variables propor­
tions of individuals with  = 1 are reported. 
1 Placeability:  judgement by caseworker how hard it  will be  to place 
the job  seeker  on the labour  market. 
2  Passive beneﬁts (150 days  normally)  are that part  of the total beneﬁts 
that  are  paid  without  a  compulsory  obligation  to  participate  at  the  active  labor  market  programs.  Normally, 
passive beneﬁt days  are  reduced to half for individuals  under 25 years  and go to 250  or  more if  a job  seeker is 
above 50 years old.  Normal  case for the replacement  rate is 80%.  Individuals without  children  and  with higher 
earnings  may  only  get  70%.  The  replacement  rate  reduction  is  not  discrete  but  rather  smoothed  for  earnings 
around  the  reduction  limit  (130  CHF  per  day). 
3  PES  cover  parts  of  cantons;  AI=Appenzell  Innerrhoden 
(complete  canton), FR=Fribourg, GR=Graub¨ unden, SO=Solothurn, UR=Uri (complete  canton), VD=Vaud, 
VS=Valais. 
4  No  cases  which  are  warned  &  enforced  in  PES  SOA8  in  our  sample.  Coeﬃcient  of  this  dummy 
not  estimated in  enforcement process. 
5 Not  used  as  control  variables in Model I. 
6 For details  on  the  modelling 
of  these  outcomes  for  the  Models  I  to  IV,  see  econometrics  section  4.  For  the  durations  medians  are  reported, 
for the earnings means.  Unemployment duration is in days, durations of  the  ﬁrst post-unemployment  spell  are 
in months.  Earnings  are in CHF (deﬂated).  Note that the post-unemployment outcomes  are only  measured 
for  subgroups in  which they  were  realised (E/NE/Y),  see  section 4 for details. 
Source:  Own  estimations  based  on  merged  UIR-SSA  database. 49 
E.  Figures 
Fig. 1: Unemployment  transition  rates  and  sanction  enforcement  rates 
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Fig. 2: Post-unemployment  transition  rates 
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Fig. 3: Duration-dependent  employment  earnings  histories:  by  sanction  status. 
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Note:  These lines  average earnings histories dependent on the duration before  entry in UE (negative values)  or 
after  exit from UE (positive)  for  all  spells belonging  to the inﬂow  sample  and to the  respective  subgroup. 52 
Fig. 4: Multiple  states  of  the  individual’s  process  history
 
Note:  Abbreviations  of  states:  w=warned,  s=sanction  enforced,  e=exit  to  employment  (i.e.  positive  labor 
earnings  in  the  ﬁrst  month  after  unemployment  exit),  ne=exit  to  nonemployment  (zero  earnings  in  the  ﬁrst 
month).  Note  that  for  Model  IV,  the  exit  destinations  e  and  ne  are  replaced  by  y=positive  labor  earnings  over  24 
months  after  unemployment  exit  and 0=zero  earnings  over that period.  See the  econometrics  and  results  sections 
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